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Abstract
Studies on economic and political cooperation of countries generally focus on the
effects of factors such as geographical proximity, political regime type, and the
different fiscal and monetary policies, among others. The impact of religious affili-
ation, however, stayed mainly as theory. The clash between and/or within religions
had important proponents. We provide evidence that religion can have economic
union effects. We evaluate whether there is historic economic polarization and
whether religions have group dynamics similar to economic unions. Economic con-
vergence, causation and trade cooperation are commonly reported for economic
unions. Do these effects exist for countries with the same religion?
Econometric challenges exist. Large dispersions within religious groups deem
σ-convergence and β-convergence problematic: two common measures of income
level equalizing effect of economic unions/groups. As a remedy, we propose a new
convergence measure namely trend-convergence. This allows us to extend the ana-
lysis to over 200 countries, 8 religions, 17 religious sects and factors utilizing 15
different data sets for the 1950-2009 period as data allows.
The evidence shows that common religion between countries is an important fac-
tor for their economic income level equalization (convergence). However, countries
with common religion in general have economic divergence and decreasing bilateral
trade. These results are statistically significant at the .01 level. Economic unions
and partnerships such as European Union and OPEC have economic convergence,
as expected. Most importantly, the only religion that have economic convergence
and increased bilateral trade is Islam. This evidence suggests that Islam is having
similar effects as an economic union.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
There have been two World Wars in history. Neither world war was related to
religious affiliation or religious diversity. In the last two decades, however, we are
witnessing a significant diversity between religions and between different sects of
religions. A trend that seems to support the arguments of Huntington (1993).
It is true that Muslim-Shias and Muslim-Sunnis were at odds since the dispute
over the first caliph after the prophet’s death at year 632. However, it is only
becoming a worldwide concern now that one side (Iran) is attempting to arm itself
with nuclear weapons and the other side (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) is forming an
alliance with the US, the superpower of the world.
The wars between Christian-Protestant and Christian-Catholics are common
in history (such as the Thirty Years War, St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre and
ensuing religious wars in France, and Catholic-Protestant conflict in Ireland). The
conflict between Muslims and Jews proved to be persistent in the 20th century.
Anti-Semitism in Europe dates back to the Roman Empire and Jews were subjected
to persecution for many centuries (such as the persecution of Jews in Russia in 19th
century and their persecution during the Spanish Inquisition and their subsequent
retreat to the Ottoman Empire). Anti-Semitism still persists throughout Europe.
Religion, while a uniting factor for countries with the same faith, can be a
dividing factor between countries of different faiths. The inherent condemnation of
other religions within religious teachings can impair economic as well as political
relationships. It can also lead to conflicts. Huntington (1993) argues that religion
is one of the most important factors in the division lines between civilizations.
1
On the other hand, there are examples of dyadic relationship that are exceptions,
outliers. The historic relationship between the Turks and the Jews had military as
well as financial consequences for the Ottoman Empire and for the new Republic of
Turkey. When the Ottoman Sultan, Abdulhamid II, was asked to give permission
to the European Jews to immigrate to Palestine, then under the Ottoman rule, by
Dr. Theodore Herzl, the president of the World Zionist Congress and was offered
to be freed from all Ottoman’s foreign debt at that time, he declined.1 Also, during
the Spanish Inquisition, the Ottoman Empire provided a safe haven for the Jews.
This relationship between the Muslim-Sunni caliph and the Jews was not welcomed
in the Islamic world.
There are also obvious examples of religious conflicts such as the Crusades. More
recently, wars between Israelis and Arab nations have their roots in the conflicts
with Jews in the Arab world possibly due to religious teachings as well as the
historic denial of the existence of Palestinian State by the Jews. Recently, within
the last decade, we are witnessing a possible united front against Islamic faith,
especially after September 11, 2001. This alliance is meeting with perhaps unwilling
alliance on the Muslims side as well. Countries, otherwise enemies, seem to be
grouping against a common threat. Turkey, for instance, a long time US ally, seems
to be giving up its accession bid for EU and forming economic alliances with Iran
and other Islamic nations. Perhaps this religious grouping has started decades ago.
Huntington (1993, p. 28) notes that “Culture and religion also form the basis of the
Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim
countries...” and “One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization,
founded originally in the 1960s by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization
1Later in history, we see that Palestine allied with the British to be freed from the Ottoman Empire.
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by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission
to the European Community.” Syria, a nation once threatened by Turkey with
war due to Syria’s support for PKK terrorism, seems to be increasing its security
relations with Turkey and Iraq, its Islamic neighbors. While ethnicity seems to be
also important, the 700 year effect of the Ottoman Empire is inevitable. Ex-USSR
countries also seem to be choosing their economic and political counterparts based
on their common religious affiliations. Fukuyama (1989, p. 12) noted this religion
based polarization trend in 1989: “The rise of religious fundamentalism in recent
years within the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim traditions has been widely noted.”
Regardless of exceptions, the main questions of the present study are: Is reli-
gion a dividing or uniting factor for countries? Is there such a thing as religious
brotherhood when it comes to international economic/political cooperation? How
does religious affiliation affect economic/political performance/cooperation com-
paratively? Finally, is there religious segregation in the world which should cause
concern for future conflicts?
In a study about religion and its comparative effect on countries, one of the
major obstacles is the data about religion. It is a variable that can be measured
at different dimensions. While religious affiliation is a dimension, affinity is also
a dimension. Being born into a religion is yet another dimension. Respondents to
surveys about religion have different states of minds that are based on whether they
are living in Iran, Saudi Arabia or France. These dimensions limit the empirical
studies about religion to major religious groups. The majority of Iran was Muslim-
Shias during the Shah and the majority of Iran is still Muslim-Shias now.
We have several contributions to the existing literature. There are four new
measures introduced to remedy the problems associated with high diversity and
outliers within groups that may potentially mask trends. We introduce the trend-
3
convergence measure within section 2.4 which is an alternative to σ-convergence
measure. Trend-convergence captures different dimensions of convergence. How-
ever, due to possibly similar growth rates of countries within groups, convergence
does not sufficiently capture the intended cooperation between religions. In sec-
tions 4.1 and 4.2, two new measures are introduced: economic causality and trend
of bilateral trade, respectively. All three measures combined provide us with a
clearer understanding of the intra-religion dynamics and cooperation within each
religion. The final new measure is for the higher religiosity in Islam. Since we are
arguing that the worldwide Islamophobia is creating a united front on both sides,
and this is a cause of concern, we suggest a measure for higher religiosity for Is-
lamic faith. Islamic banking figures (compared to traditional banking figures) in
each country is used as an indicator of the willingness of the public to choose a
more risky banking practice (there is no deposit insurance in Islamic banking) over
traditional commercial banking. Thus, this measure shows the willingness of the
public to act on their religious beliefs, which we define as religiosity. We control
for increased Islamic religiosity and cooperation between these countries in each of
the empirical test sections.
Our most important contributions to the existing literature are the actual con-
clusions: 1) The economic result of religious uniting is evident for Muslims and
Christians. While Muslims are converging in their economic situations and having
higher bilateral trade, Christians are diverging economically and having lower bi-
lateral trade. If there is polarization in the world against the Islamic faith, it seem
that it is helping the Muslims to unite. 2) There is increasing cooperation between
countries with increased Islamic religiosity. And 3) Christians and Muslims, along
with certain sects, seem to be the leading groups of divergence and convergence
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movement. All three of these conclusions have policy implications and point to a
possible segregating impact between the religions.
We are not arguing, in any way, that one religion is opposed another. However,
there is a trend after September, 2001, to suspect one religion (Islam) as the cul-
prit. The Afghanistan and the Iraq wars are between mostly Christian states and
Muslim states. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization is comprised of Muslim indi-
viduals. Iran, another Islamic state, is accused of developing nuclear weapons. In
this study, we provide empirical evidence that Islamic states have economic con-
vergence. They also have convergence in military spending. On the other hand,
Christians have divergence in GDP per capita and military spending. Shias have
the highest convergence in military spending (compared to all sects). Thus, if there
is a polarization in the world based on religion, Islamic states seem to be the only
group polarizing.
1.1 Literature Review
Religion is a factor that affects the economic and political structure of countries.
Weber (1930), for instance, argues that Christian-Protestants’ work ethics is a
reason for economic development. This argument would establish the basis of eval-
uating the comparative effect of religion on economic development across coun-
tries with different religions, including Christian-Protestants. In a similar vein,
arguments of Thomas Babington (1848) and Harrison (1985) compare Christian-
Catholicism to Christian-Protestants in terms of its less positive effect on eco-
nomic development. In a wide based empirical study, Grier (1997) shows the
difference in economic development levels between Christian-Protestant countries
and Christian-Catholic countries. He reports a positive relationship between GDP
growth and Christian-Protestant belief. Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that Is-
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lam is also a religion that has impact on the economic development of countries.
Perhaps, since level of women within the workforce is lower in Muslim countries
compared to Christians, it would be intuitive to argue that Muslim countries’ de-
velopment would be hampered compared to Christians’. The common argument of
these studies is that religions affect economic development in individual countries.
In other words, each religion is evaluated in its own merits without considering its
interactions with other religions.
The evaluation of economic development is understandably a process that consid-
ers individual country attributes. Religion is one of them. As de Melo et al. (1992)
point out, the world is integrating and economically converging. The European
Union, for instance, is one of the attempts toward regional integration that aims
to unite European nations economically and politically. Efforts such as NAFTA is
less ambitious and aims to enhance regional trade and improve economic develop-
ment. OPEC is for oil producing countries in the world without regional coverage.
NATO is for military cooperation, again without any regional preference.2 OECD
is economic cooperation without regional coverage.
Each dyadic relationship has unique dynamics based on its geographical, ethnic,
historical, linguistic, economic, political and religious situations. Having the same
colonizer in history, as argued by Grier (1997), is a factor for economic develop-
ment. Britain, Spain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, among others, had many
colonies in different parts of the world. They instilled their legal systems, cultures
and languages. English, French, and Spanish are either official languages or widely
spoken languages in many former colonies. Most legal systems are based on com-
mon law, civil law or other western law. In their seminal work, La Porta et al.
2Canada, United States, and Turkey are in different parts of the world
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(1998) show the effect of legal systems on financial development of countries. In
their grouping of legal systems, La Porta et al. (1998, p. 1130) include “English-
origin”, “French-origin”, “German-origin”, and “Scandinavian-origin”. While some
countries’ choice of legal systems is based on historical development of their legal
systems, some are based on regional proximity and some are based on past coloniza-
tions. Kuran (2009) argues that the religious culture had impacted the development
of Islamic countries due to the influence of Islam on legal systems.3 Based on the
arguments of Kuran (2009), if we were to include a new grouping to La Porta et al.
(1998), it would be countries whose legal systems are based on Shari’a (Islamic re-
ligious law). However, there are countries that do not have Shari’a as the law of the
land, but their cultures are heavily influenced by the Islamic religion. For instance,
Bangladesh a former British colony, has its legal system based on English common
law.4 However, Islamic family law has its place within the court system.
The arguments about common denominators aim to explain economic devel-
opment and comparative differences between countries. Huntington (1993) is the
seminal work that argues civilizations’ differences and states that “Civilizations are
differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most
important, religion” (Huntington, 1993, p. 25). While his study is to argue the
“Clash of Civilizations”, he also argues that common traits within civilizations are
uniting factors for members of civilizations: “... perhaps as a result, a return to
the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations” (Huntington,
1993, p. 26). In fact, Huntington (1993) argues that the religion is a major factor
in this uniting tendency: “The ‘unsecularization of the world,’ George Weigel has
remarked, ‘is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century.’
3Lack of corporations and hereditary laws, among others, are some of these reasons
4http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/legal/bangladesh.htm
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The revival of religion, ‘la revanche de dieu,’ as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a
basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites
civilizations” Huntington (1993, p. 26). These points form the basis for our ar-
gument that there should be more economic cooperation between nations with
the same religion. This hypothesis also implies that there should be relatively less
cooperation between nations with different religions. After all, according to Hunt-
ington (1993, p. 27), “Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply
and exclusively among people.” In specific, we would expect that the conflict be-
tween “Western and Islamic civilizations” that “has been going on for 1,300 years.”
(Huntington, 1993, p. 31) should reflect as relatively less economic cooperation.
Our argument is not as strong as those of Huntington (1993). We are not claim-
ing that the supposed animosity between religions is resulting in less economic
cooperation. There can be economic cooperation between any countries. After all,
as Voltaire put it: “When it’s a question of money, everybody is of the same re-
ligion”. However, we are arguing that due to the commonalities within religions,
there should be more economic cooperation between the countries of the same
religion. History, culture and religion are uniting factors within civilizations and
dividing factor between civilizations. Huntington (1993, 29) states “As the ideo-
logical division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between
Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on
the other, has reemerged.”
While Huntington (1993) is a contradicting study to Fukuyama (1989), Fukuyama
(1989, p. 11) also recognizes “... contradictions in liberal society beyond that of
class that are not resolvable.” He further states that “The rise of religious funda-
mentalism in recent years within the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim traditions has
been widely noted” (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 12). We find that both Huntington (1993)
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and Fukuyama (1989) agree on the fact that affiliation to the same religion can
be a uniting factor for countries. Religion also can be a dividing factor between
countries of different faiths.
There are certainly opposing arguments. Bilgrami (2003), for instance, argues
that the clash is not necessarily between civilizations but also within civilizations.
He argues, that the differences between the secularists and absolutists among Mus-
lims is a potential for division. This argument would be opposite to ours. We agree
with the fact that within religions (or more generally, within civilizations) there
could be dividing factors so strong that it could lead to clashes. For instance, the
differences between Muslim-Sunnis and Muslim-Shias have their roots in the early
years of Islam and did not resolve for the past 1,300 years of Islamic history. Sim-
ilarly, the differences between Christian-Protestants and Christian-Catholics are
also reasons of diversion. In fact, what Bilgrami (2003) argues is not the clash
between sects of Islam. It is clash within a sect.
One of the important measures of economic cooperation is income equalization
between countries. Lucas (1990, p. 96) for instance hypothesizes several reasons
to explain the “... absence of income equalizing international capital flows.” In
fact, he states “The central idea of virtually all postwar development policies is to
stimulate transfers of capital goods from rich to poor countries” (Lucas, 1990, p.
96). While economic cooperation could be measured with bilateral trade, long-term
integration or economic causation, what is important is the benefit each country
is attaining from the economic cooperation. Thus, we use a measure similar to
Lucas (1990) in that we believe that economic cooperation should be measured
with income equalization between countries. A dyad of countries may have ever
increasing bilateral trade and one of the countries may not be benefiting from
this trade as much as the other one. A country’s economy may be impacting
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another’s economy negatively. While one country does better, the other one may be
doing even better. On the other hand, income equalization implies that the poorer
country becomes similar, in richness, to the richer country. The income disparity
gets lower. Both countries do well but the poorer country does better. This income
level equalization is the convergence of GDP per capita between countries.
Based on the characteristics of individual religions, their relations within them-
selves and with each other, we further argue that there are general patterns of
economic convergence/divergence for different religions. Based on the arguments
of Weber (1930), two Christian-Protestant countries should be converging in their
economic development more than their convergence with other countries. If both
countries have similar work ethics, their bilateral trade should increase more than
their bilateral trade trend for other countries. We expect to find more economic
and trade cooperation between Christian-Protestants. On the other hand, just
because being a Christian-Catholics country is argued to be less positive (econom-
ically) than being a Christian-Protestant country, it does not mean that Christian-
Catholic dyads should have more/less cooperation between themselves. In a similar
analogy, just because Islam’s impact on economic development is less positive, it
does not mean Islamic countries cooperates more or less.
If it is found that Christian dyads economically converge or Muslim dyads eco-
nomically converge, it would provide evidence in line with the arguments of Hunt-
ington (1993) and Fukuyama (1989) in that a religion has a uniting factor within
itself. However, if Muslim dyads economically diverge, it would provide support
for the Bilgrami (2003).
Further evaluation examines the dyadic relationship of countries with different
religions. This leads to religions’ relationships with each other as groups, as if they
are economic/political unions themselves. Finally, these dyadic relationships are
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evaluated within the context of already established economic and political unions
such as European Union.
1.1.1 Economic and Political Cooperation Within
Economic Unions
Earlier studies (e.g., Balassa and Toutjesdijk, 1975) find a positive effect of inte-
gration between developing countries on economic growth through increased trade
among member countries. On the other hand, some of the recent studies (e.g.,
Economidou et al., 2006) based on developing countries find that trade among the
members of trade blocs does not necessarily induce economic growth. Based on a
cross-section of 101 countries (OECD and developing) for the period 1960-1985,
de Melo et al. (1992) find that economic and trade integration have an insignif-
icant effect. Several other studies also find no significant effect of integration on
economic growth (Landau, 1995; Vanhoudt, 1999; Badinger, 2001; Estrin et al.,
2001; Kocenda, 2001). There are also many studies that provide evidence for the
positive effect of economic or trade integration on economic growth and/or produc-
tivity (Brada and Mendez, 1988; Baldwin, 1989; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991;
Ben-David, 1993; Coe and Moghadam, 1993; Ben-David, 1994; Kokko, 1994; Hen-
rekson et al., 1997; Haveman et al., 2001; Brada et al., 2005; Economidou et al.,
2006; Kutan and Yigit, 2007; Cuaresma et al., 2008). In addition, Dreze (1989) ar-
gues that integration benefits smaller countries more than it does larger countries.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) argue in contrast to Dreze (1989). These mixed re-
sults make it hard to make inferences about the real economic impact of economic
unions by the member countries.
Most of the studies cited above differ in terms of methodology, data periods,
countries included, and questions evaluated. The common denominator is the eco-
nomic impact of integration and the channels in which such impact occurs. Barro
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and Sala-i Martin (1992) is one of the early studies that present the concept of
β-convergence which refers to the correlation between GDP and its growth rate
in similar fashion to the trend analysis of Dickey and Fuller (1981) for stationar-
ity. Convergence requires that the correlation coefficient to be statistically signifi-
cant and negative. Among the studies that evaluate convergence in income levels
cross-sectionally are, Dowrick and Duc-Tho (1989); Barro (1991); de Melo et al.
(1992); and Henrekson et al. (1997). Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992) also evaluate
convergence through what is referred to as σ-convergence which is the decreas-
ing standard deviation of income among member countries. Recently, Cuaresma
et al. (2008) provide evidence in favor of both β- and σ-convergence using the EU
member countries for the time period 1961-1998.
Based on the mixed results obtained through cross-sectional analysis, more re-
cent studies employ panel data estimations and estimate convergence as well as
channels in which economic benefits are obtained. Convergence provides a reli-
able measure of income growth for economic and trade integrations. Among the
studies that employ panel type estimations are Coe and Helpman (1995); Evans
and Karras (1996); Evans (1998); Fleissig and Strauss (2001); Kocenda (2001);
Economidou et al. (2006); and Cuaresma et al. (2008). The results of these studies
are also mixed, however; more of them provide evidence for the positive effect of
economic integration on income growth and especially β-convergence.
The mixed results are troubling. However, we can still infer some conclusions
from studies that show positive economic effects of economic and/or trade inte-
gration. While there is contradictory evidence, these points are primarily what is
being expected and further examined. Integration is expected to increase FDI, the
growth rate of productivity, research & development, and growth rate of income
per capita. While the effects are static, they also have medium- and long-term
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impact. The level of education increases the absorptive capacity of countries for
new technology and enables the country to better utilize FDI, which in-turn is
expected to increase the impact of integration. The size of integration (sum of
GDP for member countries) affects the possible benefits for members.5 Govern-
ment spending in general should affect integration benefits.6 Trade is expected to
increase with integration, not just with the member countries but also with non-
member countries, which in turn would lead to greater openness of the economy
and growth in income levels. Convergence in income and productivity is expected
among integrated countries and it is expected to be higher for poorer countries.
Diversification of integration is expected to improve growth rates of income level.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate religion as a common denominator
for economic and political cooperation. Based on the mixed findings in the pre-
vious literature, while we know that economic unions are advantageous for the
members, for the most part, we cannot explain some of the different findings for
certain members of economic unions. It is argued here that religion can be a unit-
ing factor for groups of countries to cooperate more and dividing factor for some
of the countries within economic unions. For instance, unions that are based on
geographic locations, such as the EU, include different religions. Thus, it would
be expected to have Christian-Protestant states to have better working relations
with other Christian-Protestant states within the EU. It also would be expected
to have Christian-Orthodox, such as Greece, to be alienated, relatively speaking.
5While Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) argues positive impact, Economidou et al. (2006) argues negative
impact.
6While Barro (1991); Levine and Renelt (1992); Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997); Economidou et al. (2006)
argue for negative impact, Barro (1995) explain that ‘productive government spending’ has positive effects.
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1.1.2 Impact of Religion on European Union Accession
and Economic Convergence
The European Union (EU) has a total real GDP of $11.5 trillion and a population
of about 488 million.7 With 27 sovereign countries as members, it is a challenge to
economically and politically unite. By the end of 1995, Belgium, Germany, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece,
Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Sweden were EU members. Considering
the alliance structure of the WWII, the EU has faced several challenges even at
its initial stages. However, these countries also had quite in common, including
geopolitics, economic co-integrations, cultures, shared histories and, perhaps more
importantly, their religion.
Since 1959, Turkey has been an applicant country for EU membership. In 1995,
Turkey formed and honored a trade union with the EU. However, no full EU
membership is in sight. While Turkish governments would like to be considered
a European country, the majority of Turkey’s land is in Asia. Turkey would be
the second biggest country within the EU in terms of its population. However,
economically, its GDP per capita and its GDP growth rate would be the lowest
among EU member countries. Turkey’ population is predominantly Muslim.
Earlier studies that evaluate the economic impact of EU find positive effects for
member countries (i.e., Coe and Moghadam, 1993; Ben-David, 1994; Kokko, 1994;
Henrekson et al., 1997; Economidou et al., 2006; Kutan and Yigit, 2007; Cuaresma
et al., 2008). In line with these findings, Ben-David (1996) show that the positive
effects of the EU membership are evident for candidate countries as well. Contrary
to this evidence, mainly based on methodological arguments, it is also argued that
7Heston et al. (2009) provide economic data for 188 countries for the time period 1950-2004 with the Penn
World Table (PWT). It is available through Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and
Prices (CIC) at University of Pennsylvania (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php).
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membership may have negative economic impact as well (i.e Badinger, 2001; Estrin
et al., 2001).
After 1995, as a trade union partner of EU, Turkey was expected to improve its
economy, its socio-political institutions, and most importantly its level of democ-
racy. However, the level of improvement is not sufficient for Turkey’s full accession
to the EU. There are several reasons for the lack of progress for Turkey. As a
country that is a frequent target of terrorism, Turkey had a significant defense
budget against radical Islamist (i.e., IBDA-C Hisbullah) and separatist Kurdish
(i.e., PKK) terrorist organizations. Turkey also had to defend its guardianship
rights in Cyprus for which it had to fight against Greece in 1967 and once again in
1974. Since, 1974, Turkey has had to finance the peace and safety of the Northern
Cyprus Turkish Republic. While these costs are economic, there are also political
costs involved with issues such as terrorism and problems with Greece over Cyprus
and Aegean Sea territorial rights. According to the peace agreements after the
Cyprus war, neither side of Cyprus (Turkish or Greek) can be a member to inter-
national unions (or organizations) if one of the guarantor states is not a member
to that union (Greece and Turkey). Accordingly, membership of South Cyprus to
EU is accepted by the EU despite this agreement even though two of the signatory
parties to the initial peace agreement are EU members (Greece and the U.K.).
In this study, it is argued that religious commonality plays a significant role in
European Union’s inner economic convergence. While there may be a union-wide
economic convergence, there is also economic convergence among the countries
sharing a common religious faith. It is further argued that religion is one of the
main reasons that Turkey cannot utilize the EU economic and political benefits to
their fullest extent. Since 1995, the resistance of EU towards Turkey, coupled with
the veto powers held by Greece and South Cyprus, did not allow Turkey to take
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full advantage of the customs union agreement. Turkey, as the successor state of
the Ottoman Empire, is charged with the directives of Ataturk to be westernized.
Islamic roots within the society and the social impact of religion have their toll on
such quest. In recent years, after a religious government was elected democratically
in Turkey (2002), the EU was in full support of “moderate Islam”. Such support,
however, resulted in powerful Islamic government which eventually diverted its
focus from EU membership towards other Islamic neighbors.
Turkey’s relationship with the EU provides a unique case study for the evaluation
of the effect of religious differences on the economic and political cooperation.
In support of the theoretical argument, the empirical evidence would evaluate
Turkey’s level of religious tendency in relation to Turkey’s integration with the EU.
For instance, before 2002, the Turkish government was not Islamicly oriented and
it was not a proponent of “moderate Islam”. Thus, the period before and after the
current one of moderate Islamic rule by the Justice and Development Party (JDP)
provides a unique opportunity to evaluate Turkey’s integration level with the EU in
comparative perspective. There is also a period (1996-1997) during which another
“moderately Islamic” party was partly in power through a coalition government.
This period, due to the coalition government, would provide a unique robustness
check; we would expect the effect of religion on EU integration to be lower than in
non-Islamic government periods and higher than in completely Islamic government
periods. The level of religious tendency for Turkey can be measured by the number
of students in clergy high schools. As an alternative, the amount of deposits Islamic
Banks collect in comparison to commercial banks can also be used. The level of
integration with EU can be measured by the level of convergence or by Turkey’s
co-integration with EU members.
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Chapter 2
Data, Convergence Variable and
Econometric Model
Several data sets are utilized for this study for political, economic and religion
variables. Table 2.1 provides the list of countries that are included in the study.
Since multiple data sets are combined, a country name mapping file is created
across datasets. While the majority of the countries’ names are not problematic,
some of the countries names do not match across data sets (ex. South Korea may
be Korea, South or Republic of Korea) .1
2.1 Political Variables
The main source of the political variables is the “Correlates of War Project”
(COW).2 Dyadic variables from this data set include alliances (Formal Alliances,
v3.03) (alliance), bilateral trade (Bilateral Trade, v2.01) (imports and exports),
contiguity (Direct Contiguity, v3.1) (contiguity), diplomatic exchanges (Diplomatic
Exchange, v2006.1) (de), intergovernmental organization memberships (Intergov-
ernmental Organizations, v2.3) (IGO), interstate wars (Inter-State War, v3.0)
(war) and militarized interstate disputes (Militarized Interstate Disputes, v3.1)
(mid).3,4 Political variables that are country specific include intra-state wars (Intra-
State War, v3.0) (c war) and country codes (ccode).
1A Stata command (stdcountry) is created as part of this study which can be downloaded and installed from
http://www.financepolisci.com/stata
2Correlates of War Project is available through http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
3While the variables available through the dataset may include many more variables, the list of variables
provided here are the variables used in this study.
4Variables names, as they are used in empirical tests, are provided in italics throughout this study. While some
of the variables may be used as they are used in the data sources, some are changed to avoid conflict between
different datasets used.
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In addition to the COW variables, a military expenditure dataset is also utilized.5
Military spending variable (milex) is the military spending as a percentage of GDP
for each country since 1975 until 2007. Finally, political regime characteristics
(polity) are also included in the study as provided by the Polity4 project.6
2.2 Economic Variables
Economic variables are used from “Penn World Table” (PWT).7 Economic and
demographic variables include population (pop), ratio of GNP to GDP (cgnp),
real GDP per capita (rgdpl), openness in constant prices (openk), consumption
share of real GDP per capita (kc), government share of real GDP per capita (kg),
real GDP per capita relative to the United States (y) and growth rate of real GDP
chain per capita (grgdpch).
2.3 Demographic Variables
Religion variables are taken from the “World Religion Database” (WRD).8 Reli-
gion variables include the name of the religion (rel), number of people adhering
to a religion in a country in year 2000 (p2000) and in year 2010 (p2010) and per-
centage of population adhering to a religion in a country in year 2000 (pct2000)
and in year 2010 (pct2010). Each religion is listed as a major religion category
as well as its various sects. For instance, while ‘Christians’ is listed as a religion,
‘Christians - Protestants’ is also listed as a religion. The total of all sects make
up the major religion category. For this study, we are using the sects when avail-
able and using the major religions if sects are not available. Religions include
5Military expenditure data are available from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
http://milexdata.sipri.org and various editions of the SIPRI Yearbook. Stockholm International Peace Re-
search Institute (SIPRI) available through http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html
6Polity 4 dataset is available through http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
7Penn World Table is available through http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php
8World Religion Database is available through http://www.worldreligiondatabase.org/wrd_default.asp
World Religion Database is a subscription only database.
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Agnostics, Buddhists Lamaists, Buddhists Mahayanists, Buddhists Theravadins,
Chinese folk, Christians Anglicans, Christians Orthodox, Christians Protestants,
Christians Roman Catholics, Ethnoreligionists, Hindus, Jews, Muslims Shias and
Muslims Sunnis. The religious diversity variable used in the study is created based
on; 1) number of religions that have at least 5 percent followers, 2) number of
religions that have at least 10 percent followers and 3) number of religions that
have at least 15 percent followers.
Other demographic variables are obtained from “CEPII Research Center” (CEPII).9
These additional demographic variable provide, on the dyadic level, contiguity
(contig), common official primary language (commlang off), common language spo-
ken by at least 9 percent in both countries (commlang ethno), historic common
colonizer (comcol), current common colonizer (curcol), distance (dist), distance of
the capitals (distcap) and city population weighted distance (distwces).
Finally, special attention is paid to a unique variable used to measure the level
of religiosity in Islamic countries. Islamic banking deposits data are obtained from
Islamic Banks & Financial Institutions Information System provided by the Islamic
Research & Training Institute of the Islamic Development Bank Group.10
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide the population weights of each religion and sect
respectively. These weights are with respect to the world. Accordingly, Christians,
Agnostics, Muslims and Hindus have the highest percentage of affiliation world
wide. In terms of sects, Roman Catholics have the highest affiliation.
9CEPII Research Center data are available through http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
10Islamic banking deposits data are available through http://www.ibisonline.net/IBISHomepage.aspx
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TABLE 2.2: Population weights for each religion. Weight is the total pop-
ulation of a religion divided by the total World population for each year. Mean
(stdev) weight is the average (standard deviation) of the annual weights. Trend is
the coefficient for the trend for the model: Xt = α + β1trendt + t where X is the
weight. Population variable is used from the ’Penn World Table’ (PWT). Religion
data are used from the ’World Religion Database (WRD). *, ** and *** represent
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Religion Affiliates Mean Stdev. Trend
Agnostics 2 21.8559 0.6438 -2.0766 *
Buddhists 8 5.4637 0.2648 -1.4842 *
Chinese folk 4 0.5489 0.0329 0.0967 *
Christians 120 39.4871 2.0369 -11.8905 *
Ethnoreligionists 5 0.5023 0.1062 0.6147 *
Hindus 3 16.0252 0.8012 4.6463 *
Jews 1 0.0836 0.0130 0.0745 *
Muslims 47 16.0333 1.7074 10.0191 *
TABLE 2.3: Population weights for each sect. Weight is the total population of
a sect divided by the total World population for each year. Mean (stdev) weight is
the average (standard deviation) of the annual weights. Trend is the coefficient for
the trend for the model: Xt = α+ β1trendt + t where X is the weight. Population
variable is used from the ’Penn World Table’ (PWT). Sect data are used from the
’World Religion Database’ (WRD). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Sect Affiliates Mean Stdev. Trend
Agnostics 4 22.1740 0.6786 -2.4815 *
Anglicans 1 1.3694 0.3306 -1.9375 *
Chinese folk 4 0.5489 0.0329 0.0967 *
Ethnoreligionists 8 0.9136 0.1552 0.8880 *
Hindus 4 16.0419 0.7987 4.6323 *
Independents 5 1.6892 0.1007 0.5141 *
Jews 1 0.0836 0.0130 0.0745 *
Lamaists 1 0.0092 0.0016 0.0083 *
Mahayanists 2 3.8571 0.3222 -1.8974 *
Marginals 1 0.0020 0.0002 -0.0008 *
Orthodox 15 6.9948 1.0789 -6.3663 *
Protestants 21 1.6023 0.1071 0.5695 *
Roman Catholics 66 24.8844 1.1407 -6.6206 *
Shias 4 1.2564 0.1934 1.1119 *
Sunnis 45 16.8929 1.8870 11.0717 *
Theravadins 5 1.5975 0.0886 0.4047 *
Unaffiliated 2 0.0828 0.0116 -0.0675 *
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide the descriptive statistics for real GDP per capita
for the religions and sects, respectively. Accordingly, Jews and Chinese folk have
the highest real GDP per capita followed by Christians. Ethnoreligionists have the
lowest. In terms of sects, Anglicans have the highest real GDP per capita followed
by Jews. Ethnoreligionists have the lowest real GDP per capita.
24
TABLE 2.4: Descriptive statistics for RGDPCH for each religion. Weight
is the total population of a religion divided by the total World population for
each year. Mean (stdev) weight is the average (standard deviation) of the annual
weights. Trend is the trend coefficient for the model: RGDPCHt = α+β1trendt+t
Stdev within sect is the standard deviation of RGDPCH between the affiliated
countries for each year. Trend in this column shows whether there is σ-convergence.
Time series analysis is based on the group mean as a ratio of world mean. Trend
would indicate whether the change in the group mean vs. world mean has a trend.
DF-z is the Dickey-Fuller stationarity test. *, ** and *** represent statistical sig-
nificance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Stdev within religion RGDPCH
Religion Mean Trend Obs. Mean Stdev. Trend DF-z
Jews 58 1.7026 0.2957 1.2352 * -2.2431
Chinese folk 0.4101 -0.9186 * 57 1.4964 0.8862 5.2308 * 0.4323
Christians 0.6568 0.4495 * 58 1.0743 0.1000 -0.1758 ** -1.6066
Muslims 2.9956 4.8624 * 58 0.8576 0.4038 0.8807 * -1.7473
Buddhists 0.6234 0.3460 * 58 0.5666 0.1488 0.2669 ** -2.2470
Hindus 2.5457 -0.7550 58 0.4988 0.1270 0.0106 -1.3086
Agnostics 56 0.1920 0.1467 0.7585 * 9.2314
Ethnoreligionists 0.5395 0.1377 ** 48 0.1721 0.0458 -0.3098 * -0.8045
TABLE 2.5: Descriptive statistics for RGDPCH for each sect. Weight is the
total population of a sect divided by the total World population for each year.
Mean (stdev) weight is the average (standard deviation) of the annual weights.
Trend is the trend coefficient for the model: RGDPCHt = α+β1trendt + t Stdev
within sect is the standard deviation of RGDPCH between the affiliated countries
for each year. Trend in this column shows whether there is σ-convergence. Time
series analysis is based on the group mean as a ratio of world mean. Trend would
indicate whether the change in the group mean vs. world mean has a trend. DF-z is
the Dickey-Fuller stationarity test. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Stdev within sect RGDPCH
Sect Mean Trend Obs. Mean Stdev. Trend DF-z
Anglicans 58 2.2096 0.2967 0.4989 ** -1.7339
Jews 58 1.6979 0.2942 1.2206 * -2.2448
Chinese folk 0.4101 -0.9186 * 57 1.4915 0.8829 5.2100 * 0.4330
Protestants 1.1659 2.2151 * 58 1.2851 0.1343 -0.1039 -1.9532
Mahayanists 0.9686 0.2190 * 58 1.2589 0.3564 0.8221 * -2.5571
Agnostics 10.1405 -35.5390 * 58 1.2175 0.2598 -0.2766 -4.2014 *
Shias 1.4298 0.2979 53 1.1798 0.4879 -0.8357 *** -1.0794
Roman Catholics 0.5696 0.2825 * 58 1.1232 0.1068 -0.0901 -1.6343
Unaffiliated 0.2396 3.0296 * 55 0.9543 0.2260 -0.7418 * -1.1303
Sunnis 3.4963 5.6456 * 58 0.8021 0.3807 0.9001 * -1.7545
Orthodox 1.0832 -0.9664 * 58 0.7749 0.1333 0.3820 * -3.5073 *
Independents 0.4391 -0.3605 * 58 0.6941 0.1268 0.2545 * -2.0376
Marginals 38 0.5001 0.1158 0.6344 * -1.2662
Hindus 2.3112 -1.6406 * 58 0.4599 0.1209 -0.2214 ** -2.1335
Theravadins 0.3156 0.7745 * 58 0.2785 0.0653 0.2059 * -0.5529
Lamaists 38 0.1794 0.0893 0.7620 * 1.9100
Ethnoreligionists 0.4545 0.2418 * 49 0.1628 0.0419 -0.2689 * -0.6547
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2.4 Trend Convergence
In a study, such as ours, that utilizes data from many different countries with
diverse characteristics, the main problems are data dispersion and outliers. It may
be a method to select countries out of the sample for the study. However, it may
also be considered selection bias. On the other hand, to keep them in the sample
would potentially impact the statistical estimation results. To solve this dilemma,
we propose a new convergence measure that is explained in the following sections.
2.4.1 Trend Convergence Measure
The β-convergence and σ-convergence measures are common in the literature (ex.
Barro, 1991; de Melo et al., 1992; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Evans and Karras, 1996;
Henrekson et al., 1997; Evans, 1998; Fleissig and Strauss, 2001; Kocenda, 2001;
Economidou et al., 2006; Cuaresma et al., 2008). While there is vast empirical proof
of economic convergence for countries in the European Union (EU), there seems
to be a common practice to exclude Luxembourg and Ireland when calculating the
σ-convergence for the EU.11 This is probably because of the outlier status of these
two countries’ GDP per capita through the years.
Table 2.6 shows the σ-convergence for the entire EU in terms of the variables un-
der evaluation. Accordingly, based on the trend of the standard deviation between
EU member countries, there is statistically significant (at 1 percent) convergence
or divergence in terms of all the variables tested, except real GDP per capita. In
fact the trend coefficient for the standard deviation of real GDP per capita among
the EU members is not even statistically significant.
11For instance, Kaitila (2004).
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TABLE 2.6: σ-Convergence and descriptive statistics for the entire Eu-
ropean Union (EU). RGDPCH is the real GDP per capita, OPENK is the
openness, KG is the government share of the GDP, KC is the consumption share
of the GDP and SIPRI is the military spending share of the GDP. All variables
are ratios to the EU averages which are population weighted. Trend is the coef-
ficient for the trend for the model: Yt = α + β1trendt + t where Y is one of the
variables in the table. Stdev within group is the standard deviation of Y between
the affiliated countries for each year. Trend in this column shows whether there is
σ-convergence. Time series analysis is based on the group mean as a ratio of world
mean. Trend would indicate whether the change in the group mean vs. world mean
has a trend. DF-z is the Dickey-Fuller stationarity test. *, ** and *** represent
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Stdev within group Time-Series Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Trend Obs. Mean Stdev. Trend DF-z
RGDPCH 0.382 0.052 58 1.941 0.276 0.842 * -2.176
OPENK 1.415 -2.213 * 58 0.846 0.161 0.891 * 0.490
KG 0.303 0.141 * 58 0.868 0.107 -0.433 * -2.620 ***
KC 0.111 -0.091 * 58 0.851 0.033 0.061 ** -2.061
SIPRI 0.448 -1.019 * 21 0.702 0.057 0.142 -2.648 ***
IMPORTS 7.975 -13.575 * 57 2.527 0.594 -1.050 ** -0.708
EXPORTS 8.928 -16.277 * 57 2.802 0.552 0.276 -1.527
Table 2.7 shows the σ-convergence for the EU, excluding Luxembourg and Ire-
land. The differences between Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 are quite significant. While
most of the trend coefficients are lower when the two countries are excluded from
the sample, the most important difference for our purposes is the change of sign
and statistical significance for the trend coefficient for the real GDP per capita.
With Luxembourg and Ireland excluded, there seems to be real GDP per capita
convergence through years for the EU member countries.
While reduced dispersion of GDP per capita among EU member is what is de-
fined as σ-convergence, removing two outliers to modify the dispersion is a statis-
tically questionable practice. If we start removing countries out of samples because
of their power to change the results, this may be considered selection bias. On the
other hand, if we leave these outliers within the sample, we will have EU divergence
of GDP per capita which is not correct for all but two countries of the EU.
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TABLE 2.7: σ-Convergence and descriptive statistics for the European
Union (EU) excluding Luxembourg and Ireland. RGDPCH is the real GDP
per capita, OPENK is the openness, KG is the government share of the GDP, KC is
the consumption share of the GDP and SIPRI is the military spending share of the
GDP. All variables are ratios to the EU averages which are population weighted.
Trend is the coefficient for the trend for the model: Yt = α+β1trendt + t where Y
is one of the variables in the table. Stdev within group is the standard deviation
of Y between the affiliated countries for each year. Trend in this column shows
whether there is σ-convergence. Time series analysis is based on the group mean
as a ratio of world mean. Trend would indicate whether the change in the group
mean vs. world mean has a trend. DF-z is the Dickey-Fuller stationarity test. *, **
and *** represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Stdev within group Time-Series Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Trend Obs. Mean Stdev. Trend DF-z
RGDPCH 0.298 -0.071 * 58 1.887 0.270 0.680 * -2.339
OPENK 0.930 -0.380 58 0.731 0.184 1.041 * 0.494
KG 0.293 0.108 * 58 0.897 0.114 -0.458 * -2.730 ***
KC 0.103 -0.089 * 58 0.852 0.037 0.097 * -1.892
SIPRI 0.436 -1.132 * 21 0.732 0.061 0.095 -2.740 ***
IMPORTS 0.687 -0.216 * 57 1.367 0.205 0.546 * -1.969
EXPORTS 0.763 -0.217 * 57 1.459 0.310 1.640 * -0.794
This issue is a significant problem for studies, like the present one, that evalu-
ate large group of countries. The problem is exacerbated when grouping countries
based on religion which tends to gather countries from very diverse economic cat-
egories. We cannot simply exclude countries because they do not fit to our group
means. As a remedy, we propose a new measure of convergence that is a derivation
of the σ-convergence. We would like to refer to this measure as trend convergence.
Calculation of the trend convergence is in three steps.
First, for dyads of countries and for each year, we calculate the difference of the
two countries’ GDP per capita as a percentage of the average GDP per capita of
the two countries as follows;
Dt =
∣∣∣∣ (GDP1,t −GDP2,t)(GDP1,t +GDP2,t)/2
∣∣∣∣ (2.1)
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In Equation 2.1, the first country of the dyad is notated with 1 and the second
country of the dyad is notated with 2. This difference is a symmetrical percentage
in absolute value. The absolute value is needed because we need the difference
between the two countries regardless of which country has the higher GDP per
capita. The trend convergence is the decreasing trend of this percentage difference
through years. Symmetrical percentage is used instead of simple percentage in
order to maintain a base level across dyads included in the sample. The symmet-
rical percentage difference between two countries with $10,000 and $1,000 GDP
per capita is 163.64 percent. The symmetrical percentage difference between two
countries with $1,000 and $100 GDP per capita is also 163.64 percent. In terms of
simple percentage difference, the result will still be the same but it will depend on
which country of the dyad is in the denominator: a problem that is not an issue
with the symmetrical percentage difference.
As the second step, we estimate the following model for each dyad;
Dt = α + β1trendt + t (2.2)
This estimation simply tests whether the percentage difference of GDP per capita’s
between any two countries is increasing or decreasing through the years. If the trend
coefficient is positive (β1 > 0) then the difference is in fact increasing meaning that
the GDP per capita is diverging. If the trend coefficient is negative (β1 < 0) then
the difference is decreasing and the two countries’ GDP per capita are converging.
If, on the other hand, the trend coefficient is not statistically significant then there
is no convergence or divergence.
Within the sections that evaluate convergence through econometric estimations,
these trend coefficients are used as the dependent variable. For instance, to evaluate
whether countries with common religion have economic convergence or divergence,
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we estimate the following regression:
βi,j = α + γCommoni,j + i,j (2.3)
where i and j are countries, Commoni,j is a binary variable that is assigned a value
of one if both countries of the dyad is of the same religion and βi,j is the trend
coefficient from the equation 2.2 between country i and j.
For the tabular sections, after estimating the trend between all dyads within a
group, we take the average of the trend coefficients.
T − convergencet =
∑n
dyad=1 β1,dyad
n
(2.4)
Equation 2.4 is the trend convergence and indicates whether there is GDP per
capita convergence through time between members of the sample. As an additional
information, to remedy to the problem associated with Ireland and Luxembourg
for EU convergence, we calculate the percentage of dyads that have statistically
significant and negative trend coefficients (β1). This percentage indicates whether
the majority of the dyads have convergence. This additional information is impor-
tant because if a few dyads have very fast convergences (i.e. trend coefficient, β1,
is too low or too high), they may mask the actual results when averaged. Thus
the average and the percentage are provided together. For samples where there
are more than 20 dyads, we also t-test the mean trend coefficient for statistical
significance.
Table 2.8 shows the trend convergence measure calculated for the European
Union. Accordingly, all of the tested variables are statistically significant at the 1
percent level except military spending. More importantly, there is convergence in
real GDP per capita among EU members. 59.1 percent of the dyads within the
EU have trend convergence. On the other hand, 23.4 percent of the dyads have
divergence.
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TABLE 2.8: Trend-convergence for the European Union (EU). RGDPCH
is the real GDP per capita growth, OPENK is the growth of openness, SIPRI is
the growth of military spending share of the GDP and POLITY is the growth of
political regime measure. All variables are ratios to the EU averages which are
population weighted. Annual percentage difference between countries are calcu-
lated (Dt,i, where t is per year and i is per dyad) for pairs of countries. Dt,i for
each dyad is regressed with a time trend variable across years. The trend coeffi-
cient for each dyad is the cross-sectional dependent variable for the models in the
table. A negative trend coefficient means convergence and a positive trend coef-
ficient means divergence between dyads. A positive (negative) coefficient in the
table means that the variable has an increasing (decreasing) effect on the trend
coefficient and therefore it has a divergence (convergence) effect. *, ** and ***
represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Variable Mean Coefficient % Negative % Positive
RGDPCH -0.360 * 0.591 0.234
OPENK -0.583 * 0.608 0.240
SIPRI -0.083 0.359 0.392
POLITY -16.646 * 0.700 0.067
Similar to the σ-convergence measure for the EU, σ-convergence measures for
individual religions and for individual sects are provided with the Tables 2.4 and 2.5
respectively. Descriptive statistics for each religion are also provided. Tables 2.2 and
2.3 provide the population statistics for individual religions and sects respectively.
The hypotheses included in the next section utilize the trend convergence mea-
sure. The trend coefficients (β1) for the trend convergence between dyads of groups
provide us with the cross-sectional dataset that can be statistically tested for ex-
planatory variables. For the EU member countries, we simply provided the sum-
mary statistics of the EU member dyads. However, each country within the EU
has a convergence relationship with another member of the EU. Thus, it is possi-
ble to test which common factors increase the likelihood of convergence which can
be tested using logit estimation. It is also possible to test which common factors
explain the variation in the trend coefficients (β1). Using trend-convergence, we
can test factors explain convergence or divergence of economies.
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2.4.2 Trend Convergence Between Religions
Similar to the analysis for the European Union, trend convergence for the groups
of countries with the same religion is questioned as the preliminary step. If there
are no inter- or intra-religion convergences or divergences, then there would be no
need for any further analysis.
Hypothesis 2.1. There is no trend convergence between dyads of religions.
Hypothesis 2.2. There is no trend convergence between dyads of religious sects.
These two hypotheses evaluate whether there is convergence among countries
with the same religion and with the same sect. Table 2.9 provide the trend con-
vergence means for the religions included in the study. Table 2.10 provides the
convergence results for the religious sects included in the study.
It is interesting to note that the only religion that has mostly statistically signif-
icant mean trend β across dyads of the religion is Christianity. However, unlike the
dyads of the EU, dyads of the Christianity have positive coefficients with Hindus,
Muslims, Etnoreligionists and Chinese folk religions which points to divergence in
real GDP per capita. Christians, on the other hand, have trend convergence with
Agnostics and Buddhists. Based on the results in the Table 2.9, it is concluded that
the Hypothesis 2.1 can be rejected in favor of existing convergence and divergence
between dyads of religions in terms of real GDP per capita.12
In terms of sects, while Agnostics have mostly negative coefficients (trend con-
vergence), they are statistically significant with Etnoreligionists, Jews, Orthodox,
and Roman Catholics.
12Tables 2.9 and 2.10 are also available upon request for other variables including openness, consumption,
government spending, military spending, imports and exports.
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TABLE 2.9: Mean trend convergence between religions. Annual differences
between dyads are calculated using: Dt =
∣∣∣ (Xcountry1,t−Xcountry2,t)(Xcountry1,t+Xcountry2,t)/2 ∣∣∣ where X is GDP
per capita. The trend in the annual differences is estimated for each dyad using:
Dt = α+β1trendt + t. The figures are the mean coefficient of the trend regression
(β1) across dyads of the religion pairs. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Religion Agnostics Buddhists Chinese folk Christians Ethnoreligionists Hindus Jews Muslims
Agnostics -0.13 -0.39 -1.58 * 1.46 -0.61 -1.08 -0.71
Buddhists -0.13 0.11 0.36 *** -0.30 * 1.61 * 0.38 -0.49 *** -0.11
Chinese folk -0.39 0.36 *** -0.59 0.72 * 1.84 * 1.01 ** -0.68 0.72 *
Christians -1.58 * -0.30 * 0.72 * 0.35 * 1.05 * 0.26 * -0.12 0.14 *
Ethnoreligionists 1.46 1.61 * 1.84 * 1.05 * 0.75 1.40 * 0.67 ** 0.83 *
Hindus -0.61 0.38 1.01 ** 0.26 * 1.40 * 0.72 0.15 0.17
Jews -1.08 -0.49 *** -0.68 -0.12 0.67 ** 0.15 -0.15
Muslims -0.71 -0.11 0.72 * 0.14 * 0.83 * 0.17 -0.15 0.06
In Table 2.10, there are more than one country with Agnostics as a sect. This is
because, since there are no sects of Agnostics, it is included into the sect analysis
as if it is a sect by itself such as main sect of Agnostics. However, for countries
where the primary religion has multiple sects, such as Muslims or Christians, since
the percentage of the main religion is split up to the sects, Agnostics within these
countries may be the main sect. For instance, if a country has 70 percent Christians
with 25 percent Catholics, 25 percent Protestants, 10 percent Anglicans and 10
percent Orthodox, also has 30 percent Agnostics, this country will have Christianity
as a major religion. However, it will have Agnostics as the main sect. Thus, in
Table 2.10, we have multiple Agnostic dyads and they have trend convergence.
Interestingly, Sunnis have divergence with the three main sects of Christianity.
Shias have convergence with the same three sects of Christianity. Sunnis and Shias
do not have any convergence, neither among themselves nor with each other. Chi-
nese folks, Etnoreligionists, Independents, Orthodox, Protestants and Catholics
have higher number of statistically significant convergence and divergences. These
results reject the Hypothesis 2.2 in favor of existence of divergence or convergence
between dyads of sects.
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2.4.3 Testing Methodology for the Trend Convergence
So far the empirical tests of trend convergence for EU and for individual reli-
gions are based on the mean of the trend convergence coefficient across dyads of
individual groups. Since we have statistically sufficient number of dyads, we can
statistically test the significance of the mean of the trend convergence coefficient.
In this section, the evaluation is cross sectional and across dyads. Each observation
is the trend convergence coefficient for an individual dyad. Since we are utilizing
a difference measure as in the Equation 2.2 for the variables of the dyad, the di-
rection is not important. Thus, to avoid double counting, dyads are counted only
once. For instance, while country1-country2 is a dyad, country2-country1 is also
a dyad. If we are evaluating the imports of country1 from country2, then this di-
rection within the dyad would be needed. However, since we are either taking the
difference between the two countries (i.e. GDP per capita) or the sum (i.e. total
trade) we do not need the two dyadic observations. Thus, we only use one of the
two directions.
Table 2.11 provides a small, random, section of the dataset used by the present
study. The dyads are available under the columns Country1 and Country 2. Their
primary religions and primary sects are provided under each corresponding col-
umn. Under the trend column, the coefficient is the βt from the Equation 2.2 and
the P is the statistical significance stars based on the p-value. The negative trend is
a binary variable that is assigned a value of 1 if the trend coefficient is negative and
statistically significant at 5 percent or lower and zero otherwise. Common religion,
common sect, common religious diversity, common sect diversity and common EU
membership are also binary variables and are assigned a value of one if both coun-
tries of the dyad have the same religion, sect, religious diversity, sect diversity and
35
EU membership status. Note that Table 2.11 is a sample in terms of number of
observations and variables used by the study.
The evaluation is conducted using two different tests. First,we ask, what factors
explain the variance in the trend convergence coefficients across dyads. Thus, hav-
ing a negative coefficient means that as the evaluated factor increases the trend
coefficient gets lower. This does not mean that the factor leads to trend con-
vergence. It just lowers the trend coefficient and therefore contributes to trend
convergence. A positive coefficient, on the other hand, means that the evaluated
factor increases the trend coefficient and therefore contributes to trend divergence
(or lowers convergence).
The lack of explanation in terms of what leads to convergence or divergence
requires the second set of tests. So far, we can only get at what increases the
trend coefficient and what decreases it. However, we would need a more definitive
explanation. For this, we create a binary variable and assign a value of one if the
dyad have statistically significant (the .05 level or better) trend convergence and
zero otherwise (as explained above). We use this new convergence variable within
logit type estimation to evaluate which factors increase/decrease the likelihood of
dyads having convergence. There are three types of dyads, though. While one group
has trend convergence and the other group has the the trend divergence, the third
group has statistically insignificant trend coefficient. Thus, similar to convergence
binary variable, we also construct a divergence binary variable and test factors’
effect on the likelihood of the divergence.
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2.4.4 Control Variables for the Trend Convergence and
Divergence
Based on the existing literature, there are some variables that are known to have
explanatory power over the convergence of countries’ income levels. For the tests of
religion as an explanatory variable, we will include these known control variables
to avoid missing variables bias and also to better model the reasons for countries’
income levels. Since we are now arguing for religion to be a reason behind inter-
country economic cooperation, the control variables are part of the model.
First, distance between the dyads is included in its log. Thus, we are controlling
the effect of distance on the countries’ economic cooperation. Alternatively, we test
whether contiguity can replace, compliment the log of distance variable. However,
in all cases, distance seems to be statistically significant and the contiguity is
not. Also, since with the logit regression, we have a binary dependent variable,
having log of distance as one of the independent variables instead of another binary
variable, contiguity, provides us with a more efficient estimations.
The second control variable is the common language. While there is no estab-
lished argument about the effect of common language on economic cooperation
between countries, intuitively, it would be expected to have easier trade if both
countries speak the same language.
The third control variable is the level of democracy. However, we do not include
the polity2 variable from the Polity dataset as provided. While it is a very useful
time-series variable, in terms of dyads, we are interested in the difference of level of
democracy between the countries of the dyad. Thus, there are three scenarios: 1)
both countries have positive polity2 variables, in which case the difference between
the two is used, 2) both countries have negative polity2 variables, in which case
the difference of absolute values of the polity2 variables is used, and 3) countries
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have different signs for the polity2 variable, in which case we add the positive
polity2 variable to the absolute value of the negative polity2 variable. However,
since the difference between level of democracy and level of autocracy have dif-
ferent implications for economic cooperation, the second scenario is multiplied by
-1 to indicate differences in levels of autocracies. EU membership, OECD mem-
bership, and NATO memberships are argued in the previous literature to have
economic convergence effects. Thus, these binary variables are also included as
control variables.
Since the dependent variable is the trend coefficient across dyads, the percentage
of difference in terms of military spending, economic openness, real GDP per capita,
government spending, and consumption share of the GDP are included as control
variables. It is argued in the literature that if two countries already have high
income levels, they are less likely to converge to a common income level. They
may both increase or decrease. This is especially true for the trend convergence
since it is the trend of difference between income levels of two countries. In another
words, if two countries have high difference between their income levels, they are
more likely to converge either by the lower income level country increasing its
income level or both converging to a mean level through years. In terms of military
spending, economic openness, government spending, and consumption, however,
the reasoning to include these variable is different. They simply indicate categorical
differences between the countries of the dyad. A country who needs to spend 30
percent of its GDP to military spending is different compared to a country that
only spends 5 percent of its GDP. Also, a country that has 50 percent openness
compared to a country with 5 percent openness belong to different categories.
Finally, it is important to consider a special type of economic cooperation that is
rather a new phenomenon. Islamic banking is a special type of commercial banking
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which is based on project financing. Deposits in Islamic banking are not guaran-
teed.13 Also, interest payments are not guaranteed. Thus, there is no guarantee
of either the principal or the interest. The expectation is profit and loss sharing.
With this type of banking, competing with international commercial banks, Islamic
banking is a challenging business. For deposit customers, Islamic banks are com-
peting against well established principal -and interest- guaranteeing commercial
banks. In most cases, principals at commercial banks are also protected by gov-
ernments such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) of the US.
Again, in most cases such guarantees are not applicable to deposits held at Islamic
banks. Thus, for a customer to chose Islamic banking over traditional commercial
banking either Islamic banks pay higher profits compared to commercial banks’
interests or customers would chose Islamic banking due to their religious beliefs.
Since historically profits paid by Islamic banks are very similar to those of com-
mercial banks and there have been several Islamic bank failures in the past and
customers increasingly choosing Islamic banks for their deposit in some countries
points to higher preference for Islamic banks due to their religious attributes. Thus,
in this study, we include a binary variable that indicates whether countries of dyads
have increasing Islamic banking deposits to indicate higher Islamic religiosity. We
also control for increased Islamic banking for individual countries where indicated.
2.5 Econometric Model
Throughout the present study, we will be testing our hypotheses using two main
econometric model templates. The dependent variable, independent variables, and
control variables will be different for each section. These will be explained in cor-
13Even though in some countries practices vary about deposit insurance, the principal of Islamic banking requires
risk sharing.
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responding sections as they apply to the econometric models. For the purpose of
compactness, the two econometric model templates are provided in this section.
The first model is a OLS regression as follows;
Xd = α + γ1Yd + δ1Common languaged + δ2Level of democracyd (2.5)
+ δ3Military spendingd + δ4Economic opennessd
+ δ5GDP per capitad + δ6Government spendingd
+ δ7Consumptiond + δ8EU membershipd
+ δ9NATO membershipd + δ10OECD membershipd
+ δ11Islamic banking partnersd + X
In Equation 2.5, Yd is the variable of interest that is being tested. The dependent
variable, Xd will change and will be explained for each chapter. To conserve space
across models we will omit reporting the results for some of the control variables if
their coefficients do not change in sign or in significance. Equation 2.5 is estimated
to evaluate each independent variable’s explanatory power to explain the changes
in the dependent variable.
The second econometric model is a logit regression and it is constructed as Equa-
tion 2.5 with the exception that the dependent variable, Xd is a binary variable.
Each individual independent variable is tested for their effect on the likelihood of
Xd having a value of one.
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Chapter 3
Trend Convergence in Income Levels
3.1 Common Religion of Dyads
After preliminary explanations about the data, methodology, and the control vari-
ables, we begin our analysis with the evaluation of common religion as a factor
explaining trend convergence. We define countries having common religion if their
primary religions are common. However, there are countries (i.e. Lebanon) where
percentage of the country with religious affiliation is very close for the primary
religion and for the secondary religion. In other words, it is too close to call coun-
try religion X when percentage of religion Y in the country is very close to the
percentage of religion X. In order to address this issue primary religion is defined
as the religion with 30 percent or more affiliation in a country. Therefore common
religion binary variable is assigned a value of one if both countries of the dyad have
the one common primary religion.
The trend in differences between countries of dyads is estimated using the Equa-
tion 2.2. This gives us a trend coefficient β for each dyad included in the study.
Trend differences are calculated for variables including real GDP per capita, mili-
tary spending, economic openness, and level of democracy. Therefore we have a β
for each dyad and for each variable: βvariable,dyad.
Equation 2.5 is estimated separately for each of the variables: real GDP per
capita, military spending, economic openness, and level of democracy. For each
estimation, βvariable,dyad is the dependent variable. Each independent variable ex-
plains the variation in the trend for a difference between the countries of dyads.
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Variables in the estimation are used as described in the data section. Thus, each
variable is used in three different forms. First, the variable itself. Thus, when testing
the trend between countries, the variable is taken as itself for both countries and
the difference is calculates as a percentage. However, a second form is also used
to normalize each of the variable with the world. For instance, for the real GDP
per capita for country X, the figure is divided by the world average real GDP per
capita. The difference between the countries is the difference of the ratio of their
GDP per capita to the world. Finally, the third measure is takes the world average
using population weighting instead of equally weighting.1
3.1.1 All Religions
Initially, the common religion measure is across all religions. This means that, as
long as the countries of the dyad have the same common religion, regardless of the
religion, the common religion measure will have a value of one and zero otherwise.
The independent variable for the Equation 2.5 (Yd) is replaced with the common
religion binary variable (common religiond).
This section is the test for the hypotheses put forth by Huntington (1993) and
Fukuyama (1989). If having a common religion has an economic convergence ef-
fect, we would argue that there is beneficial economic cooperation within religions.
However, if there is no statistically significant economic convergence, then we can-
not speak of any intra-religion economic cooperation. Since the impact of common
religion is tested using a dummy variable, it shows the impact of having a common
religion as opposed to having a different religion within a dyad. For instance, if
there is convergence (a negative coefficient) for common religion, it means that hav-
1The tables included in the study are prepared using variables without normalizations. The same tables using
normalized variables are available upon request. If there are meaningful differences between the tables in terms of
empirical results, they are included within the text.
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ing a common religion has a decreasing effect on the trend coefficient (dependent
variable) compared to having a different religion.
Table 3.1 provides the results for this section. Table 3.3 provides the same results
but also provides the results for the control variables and the results for individual
religions and sects. Since this is the first test on the control variables, evaluation
of the results for the control variables is needed.
For the first model (1) evaluating trend convergence in real GDP per capita
(RGDPCH), in terms of the distance variable, the coefficient is negative and not
statistically significant. This means that as the distance between countries of the
dyad increases so does their trend coefficients towards convergence. Intuitively, it
would be expected that the countries that are closer to have more convergence.
However, we posit that the higher convergence of countries afar is due to techno-
logical developments that enable foreign trade. Common language, contrary to our
expectations, is not statistically significant. It was, however, expected that coun-
tries with the same official language would have more convergence of income levels
due to ease in trade cooperation.
Level of democracy has a negative and statistically significant coefficient which
means that it has an impact towards trend convergence. In other words, if the
difference of democracy levels between the countries of the dyads is higher, they
will have more trend convergence. Consumption also has a negative coefficient
for the GDP which implies that higher differences in consumption between the
countries of the dyad trend towards economic converge.
Note that the level of democracy as a control variable is the difference in levels
of democracy between the countries of the dyads. Thus, increased difference in
levels of democracy increases the convergence. This can be explained with the
relationship between income levels and level of democracy across countries. Barro
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(1999), for instance, provides evidence for this relationship and shows that higher
democracy follows higher income levels. If both countries have similar levels of
democracy (i.e. level of democracy control variable is low) they are more likely to
have similar income levels. If they have similar income levels, it would be expected
that they would have less room for convergence compared to pairs of countries
with very different income levels. However, if the level of democracy between the
two countries are at different levels then their income levels would be expected to
vary as well leaving room for economic convergence.
All three membership control variables (EU, NATO and OECD) are binary vari-
ables. EU and OECD membership have an increasing effect on trend convergence
(negative coefficient) for GDP. Note that, since these are binary variables, inter-
pretation of their coefficients are important. For instance, for dyads where both
countries are OECD members, the trend coefficient is lower (negative coefficient)
compared to dyads where at least one of the countries of the dyad is not an OECD
member country. Thus, this negative coefficient is comparative to the other group
(which is assigned zero for this binary variable).
Note that OECD membership has the highest coefficient (in absolute value)
which points to the importance of OECD membership for economic convergence
compared to other variables evaluated. Interestingly, NATO membership only has
an increasing effect on trend convergence in economic openness. In fact, NATO
membership leads to trend divergence in terms of military spending. This finding
is in support of the arguments made by Olson and Zechhauser (1966) and Sandler
and Forbes (1980). They argue the free-rider problem: smaller countries depend-
ing on larger countries’ military protection. The evidence of divergence in military
spending between NATO member countries shows that while some countries in-
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crease their military spending shares in their GDPs, others decrease it. Evidence
is in support of the free-rider argument.
As the final control variable, Islamic banking partnership (two countries of the
dyad having increasing Islamic banking deposits and thus higher Islamic religios-
ity), has a negative coefficient (-0.593) and it is statistically significant at the .01
level. The coefficient is the second highest among all independent variables. It is
actually second to the effect of EU membership. To emphasize this point; hav-
ing two countries with increased Islamic religiosity in a dyad affects the level of
convergence. In other words, if two countries have higher Islamic religiosity, their
income level convergence will be higher compared to two countries with no Islamic
religiosity. The model overall has an R2 of 0.157.
In terms of the actual variable of interest, two countries of the dyad having a
common religion, the coefficient is (0.254) statistically significant at .01 level for
GDP convergence. Religion is an important factor for economic cooperation of
countries. In fact, it is almost as important as EU membership which has a coeffi-
cient of -0.279. While the economic impact of common religion and EU membership
is almost equal, they have different signs: EU membership leads to convergence and
common religion to divergence.
Since both Huntington (1993) and Fukuyama (1989) argue that religion is a fac-
tor of polarization, our finding that common religion is a factor explaining economic
cooperation is evidence for their argument. However, we find that having a com-
mon religion has a divergence effect for countries (positive coefficient). Since it is
a dummy variable, it also means that having a different religion between countries
has convergence effect. This would be evidence against Huntington (1993). Inter-
estingly however, having two countries in a dyad increases the convergence level in
level of democracy. The coefficient for the common religion for the POLITY model
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is the highest (in absolute value) among all independent variables. Thus, common
religion has an effect towards trend divergence in income levels and towards trend
convergence in level of democracy.
3.1.2 Individual Religions
The results of the previous section point to the importance of having common
religion for dyads’ economic convergence even if it means it has an effect towards
divergence. While the effect of common religion, whether it is convergence or di-
vergence, is important, the statistical significance of the common religion variable
is also important. However, the results obtained in the previous section are limited
due to the binary common religion variable that includes all religion pairs. Thus,
it is not possible to point to a possible reason for religion pairs to have divergence.
To understand the explanatory power of the common religion, we evaluate the
common religions in terms of individual religions. For this analysis, we reconstruct
the common religion binomial variable to be assigned one if both countries are
of the same primary religion and if they are Agnostics, Buddhists, Chinese folk,
Christians, Ethnoreligionists, Hindus, Jews and Muslims.
In order to test the effect of having a specific common religion, the common
religion variable in Equation 2.5 (γ1common religiond) is replaced with a com-
mon religion binary variable for each of the six religions (
6∑
m=1
γX,mreligiond). Since
there are limited number of countries that have Agnostics and Jews as the primary
religion, these two common religions cannot be estimated.2 If, due to lack of ob-
servations, we cannot estimate a variable its coefficient is left empty on the table.
Table 3.3 provides the results for this analysis.
2These two religions allows us to include the constant in the regression estimation.
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The results indicate that if the two countries of the dyad are both Christians
or they are both Ethnoreligionists, this has an effect towards divergence of income
levels. In terms of Islam, having two Muslims in a dyad affects towards conver-
gence of GDP per capita, military spending and level of democracy. Christians and
Ethnoreligionists also have increased impact on convergence of level of democracy.
These results are important because Islam is the only religion that has con-
vergence. Inglehart and Norris (2003) argues that Islam impacts economic devel-
opment, perhaps due to the place of women in the workforce. However, Islamic
countries have economic convergence. Since the data reveals that GDP per capita
is growing for Islamic countries, we conclude that poorer Islamic countries are
closing their gaps with richer Islamic countries. Lucas (1990) questions why there
is no capital flow from richer countries to poorer countries. Our evidence contra-
dicts both Inglehart and Norris (2003) and Lucas (1990) in that there is income
equalization between Islamic countries and they are getting richer as a group. Note
however that due to the construction of the trend convergence measure, there could
be exceptions to the ‘Islamic countries getting richer all together’ argument. How-
ever, based on the results of the Table 3.3, we can generalize that there is trend
convergence in income levels intra-Islam.
3.1.3 All Sects
At this point we would like to evaluate further by separating the religions into their
sects. With the main religions, we were able to deduce the convergence between
religions, specifically among Christians, Ethnoreligionists and Muslims. However,
the tensions between sects within the same religion also make it an interesting
question. For instance, we would expect that within Islam, Shias’ and Sunnis’ con-
vergences would be within themselves. We would expect to see more convergence
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among Shia countries and among Sunni countries. The similar argument can also
be made for the sects of Christianity. We would expect that the sects of Christianity
would have different economic convergence dynamics.
Note that if a country has a primary religion, it does not necessarily have the sect
of the primary religion as the primary sect. While the sum of all sects makes up the
religion and thus may have the highest percentage within a country, an individual
sect within another religion in the same country may have higher percentage than
any other sect in the country. Also, if a religion do not have a sect in the database
(i.e. Agnostics) it is included as a sect by itself. However, if a religion has a sect
in the database (i.e. Christians and Catholics) but the country fails to have the
sect and lists only the main religion, then the country is excluded from the sect
analysis.
For the evaluation of the effect of having a common sect, the independent vari-
able for the Equation 2.5 (Yd) is replaced with the common sect binary variable
(common sectd). Table 3.3 also shows the results of the study where the common
sect variable is whether the two countries of the dyad have the same primary sect.
Thus, this is general to all sects included in the study.
The coefficient for the common sect is (0.166) positive and statistically significant
in 1 percent similar to common religion. Having the same sect for two countries
of a dyad increases the trend coefficient toward divergence. The effect of common
sect is not as high as the common religion (0.254 vs. 0.166), but it is comparable
to the effect of EU membership in magnitude (-0.215 vs. 0.166). The overall model
that includes the common sect has an R2 of 0.155.
The divergence effect of having the same religion could have been blamed on the
differences between sects: Christian-Protestant vs. Christian-Catholics or Muslim-
Sunnis vs. Muslim-Shias. Since common religion does not discriminate the different
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sects within religions, the results can easily be due to the sects of the religions.
However, the positive trend coefficient for the common sect is an evidence for the
intra-sect economic divergence.
3.1.4 Individual Sects
As the final step of evaluating the common religion and common sect affiliations,
we extend the analysis to the lowest level and construct common sect variable for
each of the religious sects. The common sect variable in Equation 2.5 is replaced
with a common sect binary variable for each of the eleven sects.
The results are interesting and point to the main reasons behind having common
sect and common religion as the reasons for divergence. Table 3.3 shows that three
sects in specific have statistically significant coefficients for GDP per capita. While
Ethnoreligionists have negative coefficient, Independent Christians and Romans
Catholics have positive coefficients. Ethnoreligionists have convergence of GDP per
capita, military spending and economic openness. Roman Catholic have divergence
in GDP per capita, military spending and economic openness and convergence in
level of democracy. Shias have convergence in military spending, economic open-
ness and level of democracy while their GDP per capita is diverging. Sunnis have
convergence in military spending, and level of democracy while their economic
openness is diverging. The results provide evidence in favor of having a common
sect between countries of dyads as an important factor for convergence/divergence
in GDP per capita, military spending, economic openness and level of democracy.
3.2 Common Religion of Dyads and Likelihood
of Convergence
The results of the previous section tell us whether each independent variable in-
creases the trend convergence β or decreases it. Thus a move towards convergence
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or a move towards divergence. We can also evaluate each of the factors in terms
of their effect on the likelihood of a dyad having a trend convergence with a logit
model.
With the previous evaluation, one of the shortcomings of the model lies in the
fact that we cannot conclude whether a factor leads to convergence or to divergence.
We can only infer on the possible effect it would have on the trend convergence
coefficient. A negative coefficient can also be interpreted as lowering the already
existing divergence.
With the logit estimation, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable
which is assigned a value of one if there is trend convergence (negative and statis-
tically significant, at the .05 level or better trend convergence coefficient) and zero
otherwise. This allows us to infer directly about the factors that increase/decrease
the likelihood of dyads having convergence.
3.2.1 All Religions and Sects
Table 3.5 provides the results for the logit estimation of the Equation 2.5 with the
dependent variable replaced with the binary variable for negative and statistically
significant trend coefficients, namely convergence variable. Note that the inter-
pretation of the coefficients for the logit estimation is different compared to the
previous evaluation based on convergence coefficients as the dependent variable.
Thus, some of the control variables are addressed for this model as well.
Interestingly, if two countries are Islamic banking partners, countries with in-
creasing Islamic religiosity, then it increases the likelihood of GDP convergence.
This is important because after EU membership, it is still the second highest
coefficient. Thus, while being an EU member increases the likelihood of GDP
convergence with the other EU members, being a country with increased Islamic
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religiosity increases the likelihood of GDP convergence with the other countries
with increased Islamic religiosity.
In terms of the main variable of the analysis, common religion, the coefficient
is negative and statistically significant. This means that, having two countries
with the same religion decreases the likelihood of economic convergence. The like-
lihood of military spending convergence and economic openness are also reduced
for countries of the same religions. Same religion dyads have increased likelihood
for convergence in level of democracy. These findings are confirmation of the find-
ings in the previous section about the effect of the common religion on economic
convergence.
The evaluation of the factors that effect the likelihood of dyads having conver-
gence in terms of income levels, military spending, economic openness, and level
of democracy is extended to evaluate the impact of having the same sect by the
two countries of the dyad. Table 3.5 provides the results for the effect of having
the same sect for all sects and for the individual sects.
The coefficient for the common sect is also negative and statistically significant
at the .01 level, indicating a lower likelihood of convergence between countries
with the common main sect. Having a common sect decreases the likelihood of
having economic and military spending and economic openness convergence, while
it increases the likelihood of level of democracy convergence. These findings also
confirm the previous sections’ findings.
3.2.2 Individual Religions and Sects
The results for the individual religions and sects are interesting. The evidence for
divergence between Christians and convergence between Muslims are confirmed
with the likelihood analysis. If two countries of a dyad are Christians, they have a
58
lower likelihood of convergence. If two countries of a dyad are Muslims, they have
a higher likelihood of convergence.
These results may be due to the intra-religion conflicts or already established
income levels across the religion. In other words, if all Christians are of the similar
income levels, there is no mean to converge to. However, this cannot be true con-
sidering that the income levels across countries within religions vary widely. The
other reason might be that a sect in each religion may be to blame for the overall
result for the religion. Thus, we continue with the evaluation of the individual sects
of the religions. Our interest, however, is to explain the results for the Christians
and Muslims.
The results for the individual sects are also interesting. Agnostics, Ethnoreli-
gionists and Hindus have positive coefficients (increased likelihood of economic
convergence). Protestants and Catholics have lower likelihood of economic conver-
gence among their own sects. Agnostics, Ethnoreligionists and Shias have higher
likelihood of military spending convergence. The coefficient is the highest for the
Shias. Among the negative coefficients for the military spending, sects with the
lower likelihood of convergence, the coefficient is the lowest for the Orthodox.
The results of the likelihood of convergence are in line with the results of the
previous sections. In the previous sections, we found that having a common religion
increased the trend coefficient towards divergence or lower convergence. With the
findings in this section, evaluating the effect of common religion of likelihood of
convergence, we can conclude that having the same religion has a divergence effect
on dyads. Also, having the same sect also has a divergence effect on dyads.
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3.3 Religious Diversity of Dyads
Religious diversity is an issue that has different dimensions. If a country, such as
United States or United Kingdom, has several minority religions, it may indicate
religious freedom. There are countries, however, where there is only one minority
religion and the rest of the country believes in another religion. For instance, if a
country has several minority religions but it is over 95 percent religion X, is it fair
to compare the religious freedom in the US and UK to this country? On the other
hand, if there are several minority religions, it still has more religious freedom than
a country with only a few religious minorities.
A country with religious freedom, or perhaps pluralism, is categorically different
than a country with limited religious pluralism. This section evaluates whether
countries with similar religious pluralism work together. In addition to the differ-
ences in religious pluralism, if there are multiple religions in a country, it is more
likely that the country will be cooperating with other countries that have similar
religions. In other words, if common religion is a reason for countries’ coopera-
tion then having multiple religions increases the likelihood of of having a religious
match. Based on the results already established, since we know that common reli-
gion decreases the likelihood of having trend convergence for income levels, if it is
due to intra-religion conflict than a country with more diverse religious structure
is more likely to have a religious match and therefore more likely to have decreased
trend convergence with one of the common religions. Note that we only included
the highest affiliated three religions in our common religion measure. Religious
diversity gives us the opportunity evaluate further.
If a country has multiple religious minorities with 5 percent or less affiliation,
we refer to this as religious pluralism. Countries such as Vietnam, China, Taiwan,
Malaysia and South Korea are the countries with 5 or more religions with at least
60
5 percent affiliation. Note that this is not a religious freedom measure. Instead it
is a religious pluralism measure. Thus, the percentage of affiliation is kept rather
high to make sure that minority religions are not counted towards pluralism.
On the other hand, countries with multiple religions of 15 percent have religious
diversity. Countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cuba, Ghana,
Liberia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Singapore, Suriname and Togo have
3 religions with affiliations of 15 percent or more. It is considered to be religious
diversity because of the religious pluralism. However, having multiple religions
increases their likelihood of finding a trading or economic partner with the same
religion: one of the religions they have.
Finally, countries with affiliated religions of 20 percent or more considered to
be countries with possible religious conflict. We have several of these conflicts in
history. For instance, the situation in Cyprus, may be seen as just such a case. The
fact is that the island is split into two, with one part Muslim and the other part
Christian.
For this section the dependent variable in Equation 2.5 is replaced with common
religious diversity binary variables. First, it is the religious pluralism which is
assigned a value of one if both countries of the dyad have multiple religions with
more than 5 percent (but less than 15 percent) affiliation and zero otherwise.
Second is the religious diversity which is assigned a value of one if both countries
of the dyad have multiple religions with 15 percent or more affiliation and zero
otherwise. Finally, the religious conflict variable which is assigned a value of one
in case both countries of the dyad have multiple religions with 20 percent or more
affiliation.
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3.3.1 All Religions and Sects
We begin our analysis with the general form of the religious diversity measures. At
this point we do not differentiate based on the primary religions. Thus the findings
would apply to all countries in the sample without any interest in the primary
religion. So, Christian religious diversity and Muslim religious diversity would be
considered the same. If religious diversity puts countries in a different category,
then is there a common trend within this group. In other words, countries with
religious diversity are compared to countries with no religious diversity. For the
religious conflict variable, countries with possible religious conflicts are compared
to countries with no religious conflict.
Table 3.7 provides the results for this section. While the religious pluralism
measure has a negative coefficient as expected, religious diversity has a positive
coefficient. A negative coefficient is an effect towards trend convergence. Thus,
countries that have religious pluralism have overall lower trend coefficients for their
GDP per capita differences. On the other hand, countries with religious diversity
have effect towards trend divergence. In terms of the sect diversity, however, the
coefficient is statistically significant for the sect pluralism and diversity measures
and they are positive. Thus, countries with sect pluralism and diversity have effect
towards trend divergence. The overall models have R2s that are higher than 0.15.
3.3.2 Individual Religions and Sects
The evaluation is extended to include the individual religions. The binary variables
for religious diversity are constructed separately for each religion. Thus, if two
countries have multiple religions with 5 percent or more affiliation and they have
a common primary religion X, then the religion pluralism X binary variable is
assigned a value of one and zero otherwise.
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Table 3.7 also provides the results for the individual religions and sects. Chris-
tians have positive and Muslims have negative, statistically significant coefficients.
These models also have R2s that are higher than 0.15. These findings are inter-
esting. We found, in the previous section, that there is trend divergence between
Christians and trend convergence between Muslims. Once again, we are finding a
different sign for Christians and Muslims. For Christians, religious diversity leads
to trend divergence between Christian countries. However, the religious diversity
leads to trend convergence between Islamic countries.
In terms of the sects however, while Sunnis, Catholics, Independent Christians
have positive coefficients, Ethnoreligionists have a negative coefficient. It is impor-
tant because it means that for Ethnoreligionists, having a religiously plural dyad
increases their trend convergence.
The results are also interesting for the military spending convergence. Religiously
plural and religiously conflicting countries have trend convergent effects for their
military spending. This could mean that religiously plural countries spend less
on military spending and religiously conflicting countries spending more on their
military expenditure. Christians and Muslims have negative coefficients for military
spending although it is statistically significant only of the Christians.
3.4 Religious Diversity of Dyads and Likelihood
of Convergence
Using the religious pluralism, diversity and possible conflict variables constructed
in the previous section, we now evaluate whether their effect can be understood bet-
ter with the likelihood analysis. Thus, we evaluate whether having two religiously
plural countries in a dyad increase the likelihood of having a trend convergence.
Since the argument behind the religious diversity measure is that the countries
65
with religious pluralism are a different category of countries, there should be in-
creased convergence within this group. There could be different reasons behind this
argument. For instance, since we already established the common religion country
pairs do not have increased convergence, countries that are religiously plural may
also be lenient about religion to their economic and trade partners. Thus, they
would be more open to the idea of working with others if they welcome others into
their countries.
3.4.1 All Religions and Sects
The initial analysis is in general and disregards the specific religions. Table 3.9
provides the results for this sections and the first column shows the results for the
general religious diversity measures. Accordingly, having religiously plural countries
in a dyad increases the likelihood of trend convergence in GDP per capita. It also
increases for military spending convergence. Religious diversity, however, has a
decreasing likelihood for trend convergence. It is interesting to note that having
two religiously diverse countries in a dyad increases the likelihood for democratic
convergence. It is the only statistically significant coefficient of the three religious
diversity measures for the level of democracy convergence.
In terms of sect pluralism, diversity, and possible conflict measures, having two
countries with diverse sect structures decreases the likelihood of trend conver-
gence. However, it increases the likelihood for convergence in democracy. Having
two countries with sect conflicts increases their trend convergence likelihood and
decreases the likelihood of democracy convergence.
3.4.2 Individual Religions and Sects
Table 3.9 also provides the results for the individual religions and sects. The results
are interesting in that Christians and Muslims have different signs. Christians have
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a negative coefficient. If two Christian states are in a dyad and they have multiple
religions with more than 5 percent affiliation, they are less likely to have trend
convergence. For instance, if two countries are already developed and have high
GDP per capita levels (i.e. US and UK), their income levels will not converge.
This means that since 1950, US and UK must be both increasing their GDP per
capita in a similar ratio. This would keep their trend coefficient for the difference in
GDP per capita as not statistically significant. Therefore, for convergence to take
place, we need to have two different GDP per capita measure to start in 1950 and
gradually reduce the difference. This would be the case for statistically significant
trend convergence. Thus, since the results are pointing to a decreased likelihood
of trend convergence for religiously plural Christian pairs, this could be due to
actually having lower likelihood for convergence or due to already high income
levels.
In terms of individual sects, however, while Agnostics, Ethnoreligionists and
Hindus have increased likelihood of trend convergence if they have sect pluralism,
all sects of Christians and Muslims have lower likelihood. Orthodox, Protestant
and Catholics also have lower likelihood of military spending convergence.
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Chapter 4
Economic Causality and Bilateral Trade
Relationships
4.1 Economic Causality
4.1.1 Control Variables
With the previous sections, our focus was on the convergence of real GDP per
capita. However, if two economies are cooperating then it would be expected that
as one economy gets better it would impact the other to do well, too. Also, based
on the level of cooperation, the economic growth of an economic partner would
have consequences on the other. Thus, we extend the convergence analysis to test
whether countries with common religions and sects have causal effects on each
other. This question, however, is complicated by some important exogenous vari-
ables. For instance, many of the Islamic countries have oil producing economies.
Thus, while one economy may seem as though it is causing the other, it may very
well be that the changes in oil prices are affecting both economies. Oil prices may
have causal effect on individual countries’ economics. Before we include oil prices
as an exogenous variable into all dyadic causality tests, we test whether oil prices
have any causal effect for any of the countries included in the analysis.
Hypothesis 4.1. Oil prices do not cause economic growth.
In order to answer this question, we estimate the following vector autoregressive
model (VAR) model;
∆oilt = α1 +
2∑
m=1
β1,m∆oil1,t−m +
2∑
m=1
γ1,m∆rgdpch1,t−m + 1 (4.1)
∆rgdpcht = α2 +
2∑
m=1
β2,m∆oil2,t−m +
2∑
m=1
γ2,m∆rgdpch2,t−m + 2 (4.2)
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Since we are only interested in whether the changes in oil prices have any causal
effect on GDP growth, Equation 4.2 is of interest to us. Granger (1969) type
causality test is the test of combined significance of the tested coefficients. Thus,
we are interested in whether β2,1 = β2,2 = 0, which is tested with the Wald test
(Enders, 2003).
The results show that the oil prices have causal effect for more countries’ imports
and exports than their GDP per capita growth.1 We include oil prices into causality
regressions as an exogenous variable where needed.
4.1.2 Economic Causality Measure
Economic causality refers to a condition whereby two economies have a Granger
(1969) type causal relationship between their GDP per capita.2 Thus if a country
X’s GDP per capita is Granger causing the GDP per capita of the country Y, we
say that country X is Granger causing country Y. This is also true for country
Y causing country X. However, unlike the trend convergence measure, economic
causality is not necessarily bidirectional. While country X causing country Y, it
is not necessary that country Y would be causing country X. Thus, the dyads are
included into the study for both directions.
Causality is estimated using a VAR model (Sims, 1980) which includes changes
in oil prices as explained previously. The Granger (1969) type causation estimation
includes number of lags based on the lag selection that provides the lowest AIC
(Akaike, 1974) criterion. Thus, the VAR is estimated for each dyad with possibly
different lag lengths and with possibly oil prices as an exogenous variable. The
VAR is as follows;
1The results for the causality effect of oil prices on individual countries’ economic growths are available upon
request. The results are not limited to GDP per capita and includes results for imports, exports, openness,
government spending, consumption, military spending and level of democracy.
2Granger type causality refers to past values of one variable explaining the current value of another variable,
after accounting for its own autoregressive effect.
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∆rgdpchX,t = αX +
2∑
m=1
βX,m∆rgdpchX,t−m +
2∑
m=1
γY,m∆rgdpchY,t−m + 1 (4.3)
∆rgdpchY,t = αY +
2∑
m=1
βY,m∆rgdpchY,t−m +
2∑
m=1
γX,m∆rgdpchX,t−m + 2 (4.4)
Both equations are estimated for all of the dyads. Wald test (Enders, 2003) results
are used to construct the causality binary variable. Accordingly, if country X is
causing country Y (γX,1 = γX,2 = 0) then the binary variable for country X causing
country Y would be assigned a value of one and zero otherwise. If country Y is
causing country X (γY,1 = γY,2 = 0) then the binary variable for country Y causing
country X would be assigned a value of one and zero otherwise.
For each dyad, causation Wald test (Enders, 2003) results are used as the depen-
dent variable. Since the level of the Chi2 does not mean that causation is higher
or lower, we will only be analyzing the factors for their impact on the likelihood
of causation.
4.1.3 Common Religion of Dyads
We are extending our analysis to economic cooperation measures, namely economic
causation. The example that we mentioned in the previous sections argued that
if the US and the UK started at GDP per capita at any two different levels and
kept increasing the GDP per capita in a similar pace, then there would be no
convergence between the two countries. This is true for all pairs of countries.
The argument behind trend convergence is that, for the EU for instance, if
countries join into an economic union, they benefit. Ultimately, their income levels
increase. It also could be that there is group wise increase in the income levels and
perhaps a steeper increase for newly joined members of the union. The reasoning
behind this is the establishment of new trade relations, adoption of more reliable
legal systems, having a more stable currency and, in effect, growing more rapidly.
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With the religious groups, the argument is more complex. However, we argue that
if two countries of the same religion, they should have higher economic and trade
cooperation. So far, we found that they actually have less likelihood for convergence
(except for Muslims). Again, it could be that they are growing in similar pace which
also would be interpreted as economic cooperation. Within this co-growth, if there
is actual cooperation then there should be more bilateral trade (next section) and
there should be higher likelihood that these countries cause each others’ growth.
If two economies are growing and they are independent then it would be hard to
argue economic cooperation. However, we would expect that similar religions will
increase the likelihood of economic causality.
For pairs of countries having the same religion, Table 4.1 provides the results.
The common religion measure is for all religions. The common sect measure is
for all sects. The dependent variable for these models is the binary variable that
has a value of one in cases of economic causal effect between the two countries.
The coefficients for the common religion and common sect are negative but not
statistically significant for GDP per capita. Results for the individual religions
are also insignificant. The only statistically significant results are dyads of Chinese
folk and Christian-Orthodox sects. For them, there is higher likelihood of economic
causality.
4.1.4 Religious Diversity of Dyads
In this section, we address the issue of religious pluralism, diversity, and possible
conflicts. The argument about the religious diversity is that countries that have
religious pluralism are of a different category compared to a category of countries
where there are either no or only one minority religion with 5 percent or less. Similar
to the argument made earlier, while convergence is not necessary for economic
73
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cooperation, economic causality is an important indicator. Thus, we would expect
the religiously plural countries to have a more economic causal relationship. In
other words, having religious pluralism should increase the likelihood of economic
causality between the countries.
Table 4.3 provides the results for this analysis. Economic causality based on
religious pluralism, diversity and conflict provide no further explanation in addition
to the previous sections. The coefficients based on pluralism, diversity and conflict
are not statistically significant, either for religions or for sects.
4.2 Bilateral Trade Relationship
In this chapter, we evaluate bilateral trade as a variable for economic cooperation. If
countries are cooperating economically, trade will be one of the main variables that
will be positively affected. We estimate the trend in combined bilateral trade levels
across years for dyads using Equation 2.1. Instead of the difference between the
countries, we combine the bilateral trade and estimate the trend of it. We therefore
evaluate religions and sects for their effect on the trend of bilateral trade and on
the likelihood of having a positive and statistically significant trend coefficient.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide the mean trend coefficients for each of the religions
and sects, respectively. Most of the religions have increasing trade. In terms of
religions, Agnostics have relatively higher mean trend coefficients for trade with
all other religions. This is followed by Jews, Buddhists and Hindus.
In terms of the sects, Agnostics have the highest level of increase in trade across
all sects. This is followed by Jews, Hindus and Chinese folks. Shias and Inde-
pendent Christians have the highest (statistically significant) trend coefficient for
bilateral trade. The coefficient between the Marginals and Independents is the
second highest.
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4.2.1 Common Religion of Dyads
Table 4.7 provides the results for this section and they are in line with our expec-
tations based on the findings in the previous sections. We previously found that
having a common religion and common sect has a divergence effect on income
levels. If two countries with the same religion have diverging income levels, we
would expect them to have decreasing bilateral trade. Accordingly, having a com-
mon religion decreases the trend coefficient for bilateral trade. This means that for
countries that have the same primary religion, their bilateral trade trend is lower
compared to other dyads.
The control variables are also meaningful and as expected. For countries of the
EU, there is higher trend coefficient for bilateral trade. In terms of the Islamic reli-
giosity variable that is based on Islamic banking deposits, countries with increased
Islamic banking, religiosity have higher trend coefficients for bilateral trade. The
coefficient is the second highest in the list (in absolute value).
In terms of individual religions, Christian states that had divergence in income
levels have decreasing trend in bilateral trade. The income levels and bilateral
trade are two different variables that come from two different datasets. The find-
ings related to the trend in bilateral trade confirm the findings in income level
convergence. This is also true for Muslims. In the previous sections we found that
Muslims had income level convergence. In terms of bilateral trade, Muslims have
increasing trend in bilateral trade among themselves. This is another confirming
result.
For the individual sects, Protestants and Catholics have statistically significant
and negative coefficients. Thus, they have decreasing trend in bilateral trade. On
the other hand, Sunnis have a positive coefficient indicating an increasing trend in
bilateral trade. These findings again confirm previous section results.
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TABLE 4.7: Effect of individual religions and sects on bilateral trade for
country dyads for 1950-2009 period. Bilateral trade is calculated by adding
the imports and exports (chained 2005 prices) between the countries of the dyad
for each year. Bilateral trade for each dyad is regressed with a time trend variable
across years. The trend coefficient for each dyad is the cross-sectional dependent
variable for the models in the table. A negative trend coefficient means decreased
trade and a positive trend coefficient means increased trade between dyads. A
positive coefficient in the table means that the variable has an increasing effect
on bilateral trade. A negative coefficient in the table means that the variable has
an decreasing effect on bilateral trade. Common religion, common sect, common
language and membership variables are binary variables. Distance is the log of
average distance between the countries’ main cities. Government spending and
consumption are differences between countries of the dyads. *, ** and *** represent
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Bilateral Trade
1 2 3 4
Distance -0.058 -0.045 0.032 -0.061
Level of democracy -0.006 -0.003 0.010 0.003
Consumption -3.854 * -3.772 * -4.209 * -3.910 *
EU members 1.974 * 1.817 * 2.374 * 1.682 *
Islamic religiosity 2.919 * 2.690 * 1.372 * 2.255 *
Common religion -0.531 *
Common sect -0.178
Buddhists 2.927 **
Chinese folk 3.542
Christians -1.222 *
Ethnoreligionists -2.651 ***
Hindus -2.078
Muslims 1.783 *
Agnostics 1.086 *
Chinese folk 2.371
Ethnoreligionists -2.189 *
Hindus -1.423
Independents 0.403
Orthodox 0.030
Protestants -0.677 *
Roman Catholics -0.639 *
Shias -1.539
Sunnis 0.745 *
Theravadins -0.178
Constant 6.525 * 6.190 * 5.898 * 6.358 *
N 9898 9898 9898 9898
R2 0.212 0.211 0.219 0.215
F 43.6 * 41.5 * 33.0 * 19.3 *
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TABLE 4.8: Effect of individual religions and sects on bilateral trade for
country dyads for 1980-2009 period. Bilateral trade is calculated by adding
the imports and exports (chained 2005 prices) between the countries of the dyad
for each year. Bilateral trade for each dyad is regressed with a time trend variable
across years. The trend coefficient for each dyad is the cross-sectional dependent
variable for the models in the table. A negative trend coefficient means decreased
trade and a positive trend coefficient means increased trade between dyads. A
positive coefficient in the table means that the variable has an increasing effect
on bilateral trade. A negative coefficient in the table means that the variable has
an decreasing effect on bilateral trade. Common religion, common sect, common
language and membership variables are binary variables. Distance is the log of
average distance between the countries’ main cities. Government spending and
consumption are differences between countries of the dyads. *, ** and *** represent
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Bilateral Trade
1 2 3 4
Distance 0.253 ** 0.288 ** 0.411 * 0.344 *
Level of democracy -0.069 * -0.064 * -0.042 * -0.047 *
Consumption -4.255 * -4.122 * -4.817 * -4.335 *
EU members 2.590 * 2.392 * 3.255 * 2.442 *
Islamic religiosity 3.539 * 3.164 * 0.962 *** 2.397 *
Common religion -0.731 *
Common sect -0.117
Buddhists 4.215 **
Chinese folk 4.672
Christians -1.834 *
Ethnoreligionists -1.248
Hindus 0.349
Muslims 3.135 *
Agnostics 1.106 **
Chinese folk 3.571
Ethnoreligionists -0.817
Hindus 0.108
Independents 0.944
Orthodox -1.220
Protestants -1.000 *
Roman Catholics -0.977 *
Shias -3.263 **
Sunnis 1.676 *
Theravadins 3.921
Constant 4.678 * 3.999 * 3.532 * 3.497 *
N 9896 9896 9896 9896
R2 0.176 0.175 0.187 0.180
F 35.3 * 33.0 * 31.8 * 17.3 *
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4.2.2 Religious Diversity of Dyads
The empirical evidence so far established that while convergence in income levels
may have different interpretations, trade and economic cooperation between com-
mon religion and sect members is quite visible. In fact, the evidence for economic
causality and bilateral trade are in support of each other.
As the final step of the present study, we evaluate the religious pluralism, di-
versity and possible conflicts for their effect on the bilateral trade between dyads.
Similar to effect of common religion and sect on convergence, the effect of reli-
gious diversity on convergence had possibly different interpretations. The trade
cooperation, on the other hand, resulted in more definite results. For the religious
diversity variable, our argument is that religiously diverse countries are a different
group compared to countries where there is no religious diversity (i.e. single religion
countries). Thus, if these countries have social and religious similarities to become
a part of this group, they should also have higher trade and economic coopera-
tions. The second argument for the reason behind the religiously diverse countries’
cooperation is that since there is more economic cooperation between countries of
common religions, having multiple religions would increase the likelihood of hav-
ing a common religion match. In other words, if country X is a Christian country
and has 10 percent Muslims living in it, then country X has a higher number of
countries to cooperate with (i.e.Christian and Muslim countries) compared to a
country where there are only Christians living.
The initial evaluation is based on having religious pluralism, diversity and pos-
sible conflict for any primary religion pairs. Table 4.9 provides the results for this
section. While religious pluralism increases the trend in bilateral trade, religious
conflict decreases it. This is intuitive and in line with previously reported evidence
of economic convergence.
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TABLE 4.9: Effect of religion and sect diversity on bilateral trade for
country dyads for 1950-2009 period. Bilateral trade is calculated by adding
the imports and exports (chained 2005 prices) between the countries of the dyad
for each year. Bilateral trade for each dyad is regressed with a time trend variable
across years. The trend coefficient for each dyad is the cross-sectional dependent
variable for the models in the table. A negative trend coefficient means decreased
trade and a positive trend coefficient means increased trade between dyads. A pos-
itive coefficient in the table means that the variable has an increasing effect on
bilateral trade. A negative coefficient in the table means that the variable has an
decreasing effect on bilateral trade. Common religion, common sect, common lan-
guage and membership variables are binary variables. Distance is the log of average
distance between the countries’ main cities. Government spending and consump-
tion are differences between countries of the dyads. Religious (sect) diversity is a
binary variable which is assigned a value of one if country dyads that have mul-
tiple religions (sect) with 5%, 15& or 20% presence in the country. *, ** and ***
represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Bilateral Trade
1 2 3 4
Distance -0.025 -0.030 -0.004 -0.130
Level of democracy -0.005 -0.002 0.001 -0.004
Consumption -3.733 * -3.728 * -3.829 * -3.848 *
EU members 1.708 * 1.764 * 2.114 * 1.536 *
Islamic religiosity 2.649 * 2.549 * 2.449 * 2.664 *
Religious pluralism (5%) 0.681 *
Religious diversity (15%) 0.004
Religious conflict (20%) -1.346 *
Sect pluralism (5%) 0.306
Sect diversity (15%) -0.587 *
Sect conflict (20%) -0.404
Buddhists 2.733 ***
Chinese folk 3.476
Christians -0.691 *
Ethnoreligionists -2.709 ***
Hindus -1.893
Muslims 0.785 **
Agnostics 1.130 *
Chinese folk 2.286
Ethnoreligionists -2.090 *
Hindus -1.523
Independents 0.355
Orthodox -1.515
Protestants -0.567 **
Roman Catholics -0.862 *
Shias -1.361
Sunnis -0.107
Theravadins -1.054
Constant 5.670 * 5.925 * 5.849 * 7.090 *
N 9898 9898 9898 9898
R2 0.213 0.212 0.212 0.214
F 34.6 * 33.6 * 25.1 * 18.9 *
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TABLE 4.10: Effect of religion and sect diversity on bilateral trade for
country dyads for 1980-2009 period. Bilateral trade is calculated by adding
the imports and exports (chained 2005 prices) between the countries of the dyad
for each year. Bilateral trade for each dyad is regressed with a time trend variable
across years. The trend coefficient for each dyad is the cross-sectional dependent
variable for the models in the table. A negative trend coefficient means decreased
trade and a positive trend coefficient means increased trade between dyads. A pos-
itive coefficient in the table means that the variable has an increasing effect on
bilateral trade. A negative coefficient in the table means that the variable has an
decreasing effect on bilateral trade. Common religion, common sect, common lan-
guage and membership variables are binary variables. Distance is the log of average
distance between the countries’ main cities. Government spending and consump-
tion are differences between countries of the dyads. Religious (sect) diversity is a
binary variable which is assigned a value of one if country dyads that have mul-
tiple religions (sect) with 5%, 15& or 20% presence in the country. *, ** and ***
represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Bilateral Trade
1 2 3 4
Distance 0.298 * 0.305 * 0.354 * 0.261 **
Level of democracy -0.065 * -0.063 * -0.056 * -0.059 *
Consumption -4.112 * -4.093 * -4.242 * -4.217 *
EU members 2.323 * 2.384 * 2.948 * 2.268 *
Islamic religiosity 3.135 * 3.082 * 2.723 * 2.946 *
Religious pluralism (5%) 0.368
Religious diversity (15%) 0.191
Religious conflict (20%) -1.257 **
Sect pluralism (5%) 0.065
Sect diversity (15%) -0.431
Sect conflict (20%) 0.174
Buddhists 3.762 ***
Chinese folk 4.565
Christians -1.273 *
Ethnoreligionists -1.255
Hindus 0.581
Muslims 1.992 *
Agnostics 1.197 **
Chinese folk 3.431
Ethnoreligionists -0.874
Hindus -0.065
Independents 0.869
Orthodox -3.443 **
Protestants -0.710 **
Roman Catholics -1.514 *
Shias -3.491 **
Sunnis 1.114 *
Theravadins 1.414
Constant 3.725 * 3.830 * 3.534 * 4.412 *
N 9896 9896 9896 9896
R2 0.175 0.175 0.178 0.180
F 25.7 * 25.0 * 22.3 * 17.0 *
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While a 5 percent minority increases the bilateral trade trend coefficient of hav-
ing a common religion partner, it also implies religious pluralism. However, having
20 percent or more increases the possibility of a divided religious structure. On the
other hand, for the sects, only the sect diversity measure is statistically significant
and negative.
Combined with the results for religious pluralism, having another religion with 5
percent presence explains trade cooperation. However, having multiple sects diver-
sity with 15 percent presence explains less trade cooperation. Thus, evidently, the
existence of multiple sects is considered to be a reason for possible tension. Having
multiple religions with 20 percent presence is also considered to be a reason for
possible tension.
For Buddhists and Muslims, having multiple religions living in the country with
5 percent presence, they have higher increasing bilateral trade with similarly sit-
uated countries. However, Christians and Ethnoreligionists have decreasing trend
of bilateral trade similarly situated countries. The effect for Christians is limited
to Protestant and Catholics.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Concluding Remarks
Huntington (1993) and Fukuyama (1989) agree that religion is a uniting factor for
intra-civilizations and dividing factor for inter-civilizations. We provide evidence
that while Christian states are economically diverging, Muslim states are converg-
ing. We also provide evidence that there is inter-religion economic cooperation that
is higher than intra-religion cooperation.
In an effort to understand the effect of religion in countries’ cooperation, the
present study provides empirical evidence. There are several problems with evaluat-
ing intra-religion cooperations. Evaluations of cooperation within economic unions
such as the EU, OECD or military unions such as NATO explain changes in eco-
nomic levels. Since these unions are established for increased economic and mili-
tary cooperation, studies evaluate whether membership to these unions serve the
intended purpose. The member countries also have several common denominators.
For instance, for the EU, the countries are located within Europe. Thus, proxim-
ity, economic, social, and cultural similarities already exist. There are also already
established economic ties within the continent. In fact the intent of the EU is to
enhance cooperation.
Groups based on religion, on the other hand, have diverse membership. They
may not have anything in common other than the religion. They could be located
on different continents, speak different languages, and have quite diverse GDP per
capita levels. Evaluating convergence of income levels for EU members, Luxem-
bourg and Ireland are usually taken out of the sample. With them included in
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the sample, it seems as if there is no convergence in the EU. With them excluded
from the sample, there is convergence. We also proved this point. For the reli-
gions however, we have many more countries to exclude before we see evidence of
convergence. This is selection bias.
TABLE 5.1: Trend-convergence for the Muslim dyads. RGDPCH is the real
GDP per capita growth, OPENK is the growth of openness, SIPRI is the growth
of military spending share of the GDP and POLITY is the growth of political
regime measure. All variables are ratios to the world averages which are popula-
tion weighted. Annual percentage difference between countries are calculated (Dt,i,
where t is per year and i is per dyad) for pairs of countries. Dt,i for each dyad is re-
gressed with a time trend variable across years. The trend coefficient for each dyad
is the cross-sectional dependent variable for the models in the table. A negative
trend coefficient means convergence and a positive trend coefficient means diver-
gence between dyads. A positive coefficient in the table means that the variable
has an increasing effect on the trend coefficient and therefore it has a divergence
effect. A negative coefficient in the table means that the variable has an decreasing
effect on the trend coefficient and therefore it has a convergence effect. *, ** and
*** represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Variable Mean Coefficient % Negative % Positive
RGDPCH -0.152 * 0.502 0.334
OPENK -0.220 * 0.416 0.287
SIPRI -0.993 * 0.424 0.130
POLITY 2.723 * 0.213 0.501
To deal with the diversities within the religious groups, we suggest an alterna-
tive measure for convergence. We take the annual differences in variables (i.e. GDP
per capita) between dyads and estimate the existence of time trend. If the coef-
ficient for the time trend is negative, than countries of the dyad have decreasing
difference through years. The coefficient for the time trend also shows the speed
of convergence. By averaging the coefficients across dyads, we calculate the mean
convergence within the group. This is similar to the σ-convergence measure. How-
ever, with the σ-convergence there is decreasing or increasing standard deviation
across members. With the trend-convergence, we have a mean level of convergence
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and percentage of converging and diverging dyads within the group. Thus, trend-
convergence captures multiple dimensions of the convergence.
TABLE 5.2: Trend-convergence for the Christian dyads. RGDPCH is the real
GDP per capita growth, OPENK is the growth of openness, SIPRI is the growth
of military spending share of the GDP and POLITY is the growth of political
regime measure. All variables are ratios to the world averages which are popula-
tion weighted. Annual percentage difference between countries are calculated (Dt,i,
where t is per year and i is per dyad) for pairs of countries. Dt,i for each dyad is re-
gressed with a time trend variable across years. The trend coefficient for each dyad
is the cross-sectional dependent variable for the models in the table. A negative
trend coefficient means convergence and a positive trend coefficient means diver-
gence between dyads. A positive coefficient in the table means that the variable
has an increasing effect on the trend coefficient and therefore it has a divergence
effect. A negative coefficient in the table means that the variable has an decreasing
effect on the trend coefficient and therefore it has a convergence effect. *, ** and
*** represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Variable Mean Coefficient % Negative % Positive
RGDPCH 0.444 * 0.274 0.606
OPENK -0.624 * 0.555 0.244
SIPRI 0.303 * 0.342 0.367
POLITY -10.854 * 0.505 0.170
There is, however, a problem with all convergence measures (including the trend-
convergence) namely its interpretation. If two countries have similar growth rates
through years and there is a limited pattern in the difference, then the countries
will have no convergence. However, since both countries are growing in a similar
pace and since we have a reason to believe that these countries are growing in
a similar pace due to their cooperation, then the convergence measure simply is
not sufficient for our purposes. As a remedy, we suggest two alternative measures
to capture cooperation. First, we estimate whether there is economic causality
between the two countries. As a second measure, we estimate the trend in bilateral
trade between the two countries. Granger (1969) type economic causality gives us
a test result: country X’s economic growth causes country Y’s economic growth.
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Trend in bilateral trade also gives us a test result: bilateral trade between country
X and country Y is increasing.
There is also a unique question of religiosity. This is not an easy question to
answer. A person who is born into a family of religion X is usually considered to
be affiliated with religion X. That is usually the case. However, the present study is
suggesting that people (and therefore countries) act on their religious affiliation to
the point that they chose cooperation partners based on their religious affiliations.
Thus, we are not really interested in knowing who is affiliated with what religion.
We need to measure who believes in what religion and who acts on their religious
affiliations. Several measures exists in the literature: number of churches, number of
clergy members etc. However, these measures can be imposed by governments and
they can be superficial. Just because the government is affiliated with religion X
and has been financially and politically supporting the religion does not necessarily
mean that the citizens of the country have increased religiosity. This would be
more applicable to countries where level of democracy is lower. As a remedy, we
suggest a new measure. However, it is limited to Muslims. We measure the ratio
of Islamic banking deposits to the commercial bank deposits in a country and
estimate trends in this ratio. An increasing trend is higher Islamic religiosity. Since
Islamic banking is voluntary and much more risky (no deposit insurance) than
traditional commercial banking, increasing preference for Islamic banking would
indicate increased religiosity. In other words, increased tendency of people to act
on their religious beliefs.
The evidence points to lower convergence and divergence between common reli-
gions and common sects. However, there is economic convergence among Muslims.
This is evidence of polarization in the world.
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We can also conclude that there is more convergence between different religion
and sect country dyads. This, on the other hand, is an evidence against the so
called “clash of civilizations”.
In terms of increased bilateral trade, there is sufficient evidence to prove that
while common religion and common sect dyads among non-Muslims have decreas-
ing trade cooperation, Muslim dyads have increasing trade cooperations. There is
also increased cooperation between the countries with increased Islamic religiosity.
The effect is second to the effect of EU membership. These results are obtained
after controlling for the common control variables such as distance, language, or-
ganizational memberships, level of income, level of democracy, level of military
spending, government spending and consumption share of GDP.
For future studies, if the data permit, the evaluation of religiosity for all major
religions would further our understanding of certain group dynamics. However, the
measure has to be the choice of the public and not government imposed. We believe
that certain governmental policies interfere with some of the religiosity measures.
5.2 Possible Explanations for Economic
Convergence between Islamic Countries
Our results indicate a convergence among Muslim countries and a divergence
among Christian countries. These results are confirmed with the evaluation of
bilateral trade as well. In this section, we discuss possible reasons for the economic
convergence and increased bilateral trade between Muslim countries.
5.2.1 Economic Sanctions
Increased economic cooperation between Muslim countries could partly be due to
the economic sanctions, as an unintended consequence, imposed upon them by
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Christian countries.1 Muslim countries, as the receiver of economic sanctions, may
have no other option but to turn to their “brothers” for economic relations. If
there are restrictions in economic trade, Islamic nations would have to turn to
other nations who do not impose economic sanctions. For instance, if sanctions are
imposed on Libya, it would have to work with countries who are still willing to
work with Libya despite the economic sanctions. As an oil producing country, with
relatively higher income per capita levels, Libya is a potential economic partner
to countries that are perhaps recipients of sanctions themselves and with lower
income per capita levels.
Sanctions are “actions initiated by one or more international actors (the senders)
against one or more others (the receivers) with either or both of two purposes: to
punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers
comply with certain norms the senders deem important” (Galtung, 1967, p. 379).
Some contend that, in terms of influencing “the receivers,” economic sanctions
are for the most part ineffective (Galtung, 1967; Adler-Karlsson, 1968; Baldwin,
1985; Doxey, 1971; Wallensteen, 1968; Drury, 1998; Elliott, 1998; Kaempfer and
Lowenberg, 1999; Drezner, 1998, 2000).
In contrast, Hufbauer et al. (1999) find that sanctions prove to be successful
about one-third of the time when they aim at moderate foreign policy goals. Blan-
chard and Ripsman (1999) condition the effectiveness of economic sanctions to the
“costs” of compliance and defiance. If the costs of defiance (for the receiver) are
lower than the costs of compliance, the effectiveness of economic sanctions will be
substantially reduced. Also, Marinov (2005, p. 565) argues for the success of eco-
1As examples of the list of countries that are economically sanctioned by US can be accessed via http:
//www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx and by UK can be accessed
via http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_sanctions_currentindex.htm
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nomic sanctions through “the destabilizing effects” of sanctions on the incumbent
leaders in the receiving countries.
5.2.2 Colonizations and Effect of “Umma”
Economic convergence among Islamic countries may partly be due to impact of
colonization. The post WWII period witnessed a renewed nationalism and ensuing
independence movements throughout Africa, South America, and large segments
of Asia which, with the exception of South America, hold large numbers of Muslim
populations.
Even though there is no consensus about the nature of Islamic movements
(Lewis, 1993; Pipes, 2001; Cavatorta, 2005; Esposito, 1998; Lapidus, 1997; Keddie,
1994; Halliday, 1995; Roy, 1999; Denoeux, 2002) which gained momentum after the
decolonization of many Muslim countries, “umma” which refers to “one Islamic na-
tion,” projects a political and economic integration throughout the Islamic world.2
Islam considers all Muslims as part of “Umma” regardless of their nationalities,
which is in total opposition of the Western nomenclature “nation state”.
Our findings in terms of the economic convergence among Muslim countries may
be partly due to one of the most fundamental concepts of Islam. In a highly polar-
ized post September 2001 world, the “perceived war on Islam” by many Muslim
societies, and the lack of dialogue and cooperation between the West and Muslim
countries should perhaps be considered as a uniting factor among Muslim countries.
Perhaps Islamic nations are reverting back to their original teachings: “umma.”
Acemoglu et al. (2002, p. 1244) find that colonization of the non-European ar-
eas by the imperialistic European powers had a diverse impact, which they call
“reversal of fortune,” in the colonized world. They hold that in areas which were
2Although “umma” is used in reference to several different concepts in Qur’an
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densely populated, European states kept indigenous institutions to extract those
areas’ wealth by forced labor of the indigenous people. In areas which was scarcely
populated and welcomed large numbers of European immigrants after colonization,
they established new institutions which were protective of property rights. Under
these latter institutions, trade and industry have flourished. When the industrial
revolution arrived, these economies were better equipped to adapt. As a result,
those areas which were richer by the 1500’s, such as South America and India,
compared to Europe, became increasingly underdeveloped.
Hibbs et al. (2004) emphasize the importance of geography and natural endow-
ments in terms of economic development. Even after controlling for the impact
of institutions, geography holds its position as a “make or break” factor in the
differential economic development of different regions of the world. Geography and
national endowments transformed some areas into agrarian societies earlier than
other regions which were less fortunate in terms of geography and natural en-
dowments. This condition encouraged innovation, industrialization and economic
growth.
Chanda and Putterman (2007) find some common ground between these two
contradicting views. Their findings show that before the year 1500, early transition
to agriculture was crucial in terms of economic development, a finding in line
with Hibbs et al. (2004). They also find evidence for Acemoglu et al. (2002, p.
1244) argument of “the reversal of fortune”. However, their argument differs from
Acemoglu et al. (2002) for the period after decolonization. Chanda and Putterman
(2007, p. 19) contend that:
“However, unlike AJR [Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Acemoglu et al.
(2002)], we break the data at the year 1960 and find that the reversal
process, which they extend right through 1995, was actually being un-
done during the post-World War II period, during which the effects of
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European expansion and colonialism appear finally to have been wear-
ing off. During 1960 1998, old agrarian societies like China, Taiwan,
South Korea, and (more recently) India began to catch up with ear-
lier industrializers, while most of the new states of sub-Saharan Africa,
much of Latin America, and other countries that were less advanced
with respect to agrarian state development, urbanization and popula-
tion density in 1500, experienced slow or no net economic growth”.
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Chapter 6
Case Study of the Turkish Accession to
the EU: Are Religious Parties More
Successful?
6.1 Introduction
Turkey is a country whose population is predominantly Muslim. While the building
blocks of the republic are based on secularism, recent years has witnessed a rise
in Islamic tendencies in Turkish politics. The concept of “Moderate Islam” was
pronounced by the US and by the major EU countries. If the elected party in
Turkey is “religious right” but are “moderate Islamists”, it is the part of the
democratic process. Just as any one of the many political parties may be elected,
a religious right party may also be elected. In fact, the Justice and Development
Party (JDP) was elected in 2002 by receiving 34.28 percent of the vote and later
in 2007 by receiving 46.58 percent of the vote.1
This unprecedented victory for a religious right party brought many questions
with it: 1) Are religious political parties pro-EU (or pro-western)? 2) As Turkey
gets more religious, does EU membership become harder? 3) Do Islamic roots
prohibit Turkey from accession to the EU anyway? Ataturk’s Turkey is built on
pro-western values. Membership in the EU is just another step in this direction.
Alliance with the US and membership to the NATO are also vital for this purpose.
Now that Turkey has a religious right party in the government, is Turkey going to
continue in the same direction or is it going to turn elsewhere? For the other side
of the debate, will the western world be as receptive to Turkey as it was before?
1Source for the elections is the Turkish Statistics Institute available through http://www.tuik.gov.tr/
VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=42&ust_id=12
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Turkey is a unique case study to test the effects of religion on political and eco-
nomic process. The diversity of political parties and governments provide oppor-
tunity for comparison. As a NATO member, ally of the US, and the EU’s customs
partner, it is part of the western world. The Turkish military is also prominent
in making sure that Turkey stays within the pro-western direction. On the other
hand, Turkey is also a member of the Islamic Development Organization and most
of its population is Muslim. Based on the rise in religious tendencies in Turkey
within the last few years, Turkey also provides a unique case for a time-series
comparison. Comparison between different governments with different levels of re-
ligious tendency allows for the testing of the impact of religion in a time-series as
well as in a cross-sectional analysis.
Any study that measures the impact of religion faces a challenge; how to mea-
sure religious tendency? This challenge is coupled with the potentially varying
religious tendency of the public and religious tendency of the government. Several
traditional measures are discussed in this study, including number of mosques, the
government’s budget for religious affairs, Qur’an courses, etc. However, each of
these proxies of religious tendencies has its bias. Turkey also provides a unique
proxy for the public’s as well as the government’s religious tendencies. In Turkey,
Islamic banking and traditional commercial banking are kept separate. In coun-
tries like Malaysia and Indonesia, both banking systems are integrated and it is
extremely hard to separate one from the other. However, for Turkey, the two sys-
tems are separate, providing a unique opportunity to measure the tendency of
the public to divert their funds from traditional commercial banking to Islamic
banking. Utilizing this proxy, change in public religious tendency is measured.
In terms of the government’s religious tendencies, the proxy is more complicated.
For instance, during the Erbakan’s 54th government, the government’s religious ten-
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dency has increased noticeably and caused a military intervention. In fact, almost
all previous governments’ extremist tendencies met with military intervention ei-
ther as a military coup or as a warning of such. Also, several political parties were
closed by the Constitutional High Court. However, the JDP’s 58th, 59th and 60th
governments did not meet any military resistance. In fact, the only time the Turk-
ish military warned JDP -before the 2007 elections- is alleged to be the reason
for the JDP’s unprecedented victory. Even the Constitutional High Court did not
close the JDP based on evidently proven allegations. This time, the High Court
penalized the JDP with a fine which is, in effect, acknowledgment that the JDP
became un-secular. The difference between the two JDP governments, the 59th and
the 60th, is considered to the difference between religious right party government
and government with high religious tendencies.
These two unique proxies provide a variable for level of religious tendency; an
opportunity to compare two periods. A period with a low level of religious tendency
is compared to a period with a high level of religious tendency. In order to test
the political and economic impact of religion, financial market data is utilized.
If the Turkish public believes that the EU and Turkey are integrated, they will
expect European markets to influence the Turkish market. In other words, if the
European markets Granger (1969) type cause the Turkish market, this implies that
Turkish market is integrated with the European markets. Such time series analysis,
along with the different levels of religious tendencies, allows evaluation of impact
of religion on international integration.
While the Turkish market is highly and statistically significantly correlated with
the European as well as with the American markets, the correlations are especially
visible after 1997. However, in terms of the causality, it is interesting to note that
there is a significant difference between the Erdogan’s 59th and 60th governments,
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as expected. For the first term, as part of the democratic process, a religious
right party is welcomed in terms of Turkey’s continued international integration
through the EU and the US markets. However, for the second term, after the level
of religious tendency increased and became evident, the integration with the EU
discontinued. This is also the time that Turkish public opinion started to turn
away from Turkey’s EU bid.
The next section provides theoretical background in effects of religion on politics
and economy as well as impact of economic union membership (EU in specific).
Within the third section, Turkish-EU relations are briefly evaluated with a his-
torical perspective. The fourth section provides the discussion about the religious
tendencies in Turkey and provides the evidence necessary to establish the increase
in Islamic tendencies. Within the fifth section international integration is evalu-
ated empirically and conclusion is provided with the empirical results. Appendix
provides the informative tables as well as empirical result tables.
6.2 Literature Review
Several arguments are made in this study. First, it is the differences in religion that
ultimately affects the EU’s willingness to have Turkey as an equal partner. Sec-
ond, such differences also alters the ways and the levels at which Turkey cooperates
with other EU member countries politically, economically and socially. Third, as
the Turkish public and government become more religious, its international inte-
gration is severed. Fourth, having a different religion (and thus a different social
and cultural background) within an economic union is a factor that affects the
economic and political convergence and co-integration.
Studies such as Nelsen et al. (2001) argue that there is different support levels
for the EU by different divisions of Christianity. However, there is a gap in the lit-
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erature to argue religion as an underlying reason for and against union integration,
due to its difference to the religion of other members. One of the main reasons for
such a gap in the literature is the availability of data. For instance, Davis et al.
(2007) provide2 General Social Surveys results for the period between 1972 and
2006. In this survey the questions about religion are intended to measure public
opinion about issues such as abortion that are related to religion. Also, some of
the questions are intended to measure the religiosity of the participants. Use of
this dataset may prove to be useful in evaluating the hypothesis argued by Nelsen
et al. (2001). However, it still falls short of providing the link between religiosity’s
impact on political decision making. Just because a social group is classified under
a religious denomination it does not necessarily mean that its religiosity influences
its political decision making process. However, absent survey data, different as-
sumptions are needed. We may need to assume that if a person is a church- or a
mosque- participant then that person’s religiosity is high. However, we still do not
have a reliable measure for how much a persons’ religiosity affects their political
decisions. We also cannot reliably measure a persons’ secular tendencies. While a
person can be quite religious, he/she could be a strong supporter of secular views.
Therefore, even if survey data existed for Turkey, we still would not be able to
use it reliably as long as we cannot measure the impact of religiosity on political
decision making.
The argument in this study is based on a premise that as social differences in-
crease between nations, countries will not be able to take full economic advantage
of the economic unions. This will result in nations forming unions with similar
cultures. Considering religion as a dominant factor on cultures, religion becomes
2 The data is available through http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/04697.xml
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a separating or uniting factor between countries. For Turkey’s bid for EU mem-
bership, this is the case. The EU as a Christian club is socially and religiously
different than Turkey. As Turkey moves culturally closer to the western world, EU
nations will be more receptive. However, if Turkey moves towards Islamic culture,
towards more Middle Eastern culture, then EU nations will be skeptical towards
Turkey’s admission to the union.
Earlier studies that evaluate the economic impact of the EU find positive effects
for member countries (i.e. Coe and Moghadam, 1993; Ben-David, 1994; Kokko,
1994; Henrekson et al., 1997; Economidou et al., 2006; Kutan and Yigit, 2007;
Cuaresma et al., 2008) In line with these findings, Ben-David (1996) shows that
positive effects of EU membership are evident for candidate countries as well.
Contrary to this evidence, mainly based on methodological arguments, it has also
been argued that membership may have a negative economic impact as well (i.e.
Badinger, 2001; Estrin et al., 2001). The absorption capacity of a country is argued
by Lucas (1993); Xu (2000); Krueger and Lindahl (2001); Narula (2001); and Bal-
asubramanyam et al. (2002) as a condition to benefit from the economic unions.
However, religion is not specifically argued as either a deterrent or a motivator for
becoming part of or taking advantage of an economic union.
The empirical evidence evaluates Turkey’s level of religious tendency in rela-
tion to Turkey’s integration with the EU and its co-integration with EU members.
However, there are different methodological views as to the measure of integra-
tion. Dowrick and Duc-Tho (1989); Barro (1991); Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992);
de Melo et al. (1992); Henrekson et al. (1997) provide evidence for a β-convergence
which is more of a convergence measure between union members than their inte-
gration. If the members have statistically significant stationarity, then they should
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be converging. In this study, Granger (1969) type causality is used as a measure of
integration instead of converge measures, since Turkey is not a member country.
6.3 Turkey and the EU
The European Union (EU) has a total real GDP of $11.5 trillion3 and a population
of about 488 million. With 27 sovereign countries as members, it is a challenge to
economically and politically unite. By the end of 1995, Belgium, Germany, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece,
Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Sweden were EU members. Considering the
alliance structure of the WWII, the EU has faced several challenges even at its
initial stages. However, these countries also had quite a lot in common, including
their geopolitical situations, economical co-integrations, cultures, shared histories
and, their religion.
Turkey has been an applicant country for EU membership since 1959. It has
formed and honored a trade union with the EU since 1995. However, no full mem-
bership is in sight. While Turkish governments would like Turkey to be considered
a European country, the majority of Turkey’s land is in Asia. Turkey would be
the second biggest country within the EU in terms of its population. However,
Turkish GDP per capita and GDP growth would be the lowest among EU member
countries. Turkey is also a predominantly Muslim country.
Since 1995, as a trade union partner of EU, Turkey was expected to improve its
economy, its socio-political institutions, and, most importantly, its level of democ-
racy. However, the level of improvement is not sufficient for Turkey’s full accession
to the EU. There are several reasons for the lack of progress for Turkey. As a coun-
try that is a frequent target of terrorism, Turkey had a significant defense budget
3Heston et al. (2009) provide economic data for 188 countries for the time period 1950-2004 with the Penn
World Table (PWT)
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against Islamic (i.e. IBDA-C Hisbullah), Kurdish (i.e. PKK), and Armenian (i.e.
ASALA) terrorist organizations. Turkey also had to defend its guardianship rights
in Cyprus, for which it had to fight against Greek aggression in 1967 and once
again in 1974. Since 1974, Turkey has had to finance the peace and the safety
of the Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic. While these costs are economic, there
are also political costs involved with such issues as terrorism and Greek aggres-
sion against Turkey over Cyprus and Aegean Sea territorial rights. According to
the 1960 Cypriot constitution, Cyprus (Turkish or Greek) as a whole cannot be a
member to an international unions (or organizations) if one of the guarantor states
(Greece and Turkey) is not a member to that union. Accordingly, membership of
South Cyprus to EU is accepted by the EU despite this agreement, even though
two of the signatory parties to the initial peace agreement are EU members (Greece
and the U.K.).
Since 1995, the resistance of EU towards Turkey, coupled with the veto powers
held by Greece and South Cyprus, did not allow Turkey to take full advantage of the
customs union agreement. Turkey, as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, is
charged with the directives of Ataturk to be westernized. Islamic roots within the
society and the social impact of religion have taken their toll on such quest. Over
the recent years, after a religious government was elected democratically in Turkey
(2002), the EU was in full support of “moderate Islam”. Such support, however,
resulted in powerful Islamic government which eventually diverted its focus from
EU membership towards other Islamic neighbors. It also damaged its relationship
with Israel in favor of the Palestinian Hamas.
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TABLE 6.1: Financial Assistance (in millions) by EU to Turkey. Source:
Directly taken from the Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade
available through www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/AB/TeknikMevzuatDb/
Financial Assistance (1963-1995) Commitment Utilized Percent utilized
Credits 1,152 927 80.47%
Grants 453 78 17.22%
Total 1,605 1,005 62.62%
Financial Assistance (1996-1999) Commitment Utilized Percent utilized
Credits 1,507 557 36.96%
Grants 768 52 6.77%
Total 2,275 609 26.77%
In terms of financial relations between Turkey and the EU, there are three peri-
ods 4: 1) 1963-1995, 2) 1996-1999 and 3) 1999-2006. Table 6.1 provides the financial
assistance by the EU to Turkey for the first and the second periods.
Accordingly, while the EU’s commitment to low interest credits and grants in-
crease in the second period (after the customs union), utilization of credits is only
36.96 percent and the utilization of grants is only 6.77 percent. According to the
Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, an additional 750 mil-
lion EURO credit facility as part of the customs union agreement could not be
utilized by Turkey due to Greece’s veto. An additional 375 million EURO grant
also could not be utilized due to Greece’s veto.
Ozcan (2005) reports that for the period between 2000 and 2006 the grant com-
mitment by the EU for Turkey was 1.7 billion EURO. For the same period, the
grant commitment by EU for Romania is 5.1 billion EURO, for Bulgaria 2.8 billion
EURO and for Poland 15.3 billion EURO. The financial assistance for the EU mem-
ber states are also significantly higher than utilized credits and grants by Turkey
who is only a customs union member. According to Ozcan (2005), Spain received
4According to Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade available through www.dtm.gov.tr/
dtmadmin/upload/AB/TeknikMevzuatDb/TR_AB_Mali_iliskileri_Tarihi.doc
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200 billion EURO (1986-2006), Portugal received 85 billion EURO (1986-2006) and
Greece received 90 billion EURO (1981-2006).
6.4 Religious Tendencies in Turkey
Since there is no certain measure of religious tendencies for societies (and for
individuals), several proxies are utilized in this study. However, some of the obvious
proxies that are common in the literature have certain biases. For instance, Table
6.2 provides the number of mosques in Turkey. According to these data, 73,772
mosques in 1998 have increased to 79,096, an increase of 7.22 percent. However,
based on the annual increase, each year’s increase is less than 1 percent whereas the
Turkish population increase is estimated to be more than 1.5 percent per year.5
Thus, it can be concluded that the number of people per mosque is increasing.
There are also statistics available for the participants of Qur’an courses, which
would be a good measure of public religious tendency. However, since the penalties
for running an unofficial Qur’an course are very minimal, the accuracy of official
figures is doubtful. Another official figure to use as a religious proxy is the budget
provided for the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey. However, this institution
may need more budgetary share to promote decreasing religious tendencies. Thus,
it is not safe to consider the increasing budget of this institution as an indication
of increasing religious tendency.
In this study, a more reliable measure is proposed. In 1984, the first Ozal gov-
ernment allowed operations of Islamic banks. While none of the commercial banks
worked with an “Islamic banking window” similar to practices in Malaysia and
Indonesia, specialized “financial houses” were established.6 In other words, unlike
other countries where commercial banks and Islamic banks were hard to distin-
guish, in Turkey they were kept separate. In fact, until the Erdogan government in
5http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?tb_id=39&ust_id=11
6Please refer to Participation Banks Association of Turkey at http://www.tkbb.org.tr/en/ for more informa-
tion about the Islamic banking in Turkey.
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TABLE 6.2: Number of Mosques in Turkey. Source: Presidency of Religious
Affairs available at http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/default.asp
Year Number of mosques Change
1998 73,772
1999 74,356 0.79%
2000 75,002 0.87%
2001 75,369 0.49%
2002 75,941 0.76%
2003 76,445 0.66%
2004 77,151 0.92%
2005 77,777 0.81%
2006 78,608 1.07%
2007 79,096 0.62%
2005, these “special finance houses” were not allowed to use the name “bank”. It
was also illegal to use the name Islamic bank’. While deposit insurance privileges
were available to the depositors of commercial banks, special finance houses opted
out of the deposit insurance due to Shari’ah rules about the Islamic banking. Due
to frequent financial crises around the world and in Turkey (i.e. Thai and Rus-
sian crisis of 2001), deposit insurance became quite valuable for the depositors.
This limited the special finance houses’ growth. With the Erdogan government, in
2005, special finance houses were given a bank status and brought under the de-
posit insurance umbrella (even though Shari’ah laws did not change or receive new
interpretation). Their name was changed from “special finance house” to “partici-
pation bank”. However, commercial banks and participation banks were still kept
separate.
Table 6.3 provides the quarterly changes in deposits collected (converted to
USD) by commercial banks and participation banks operating in Turkey.7 It can
be argued that the limited growth of Islamic banks in Turkey before 2005 was due
7In our analysis, we use the monthly data which can be obtained from the Central Bank of Turkey (http:
//www.tcmb.gov.tr/). We provide the quartely data for compactness purposes.
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to the lack of deposit insurance. Thus, it had no bearing on the religious preferences
of the public in their day-to-day trade and savings. Also, it can be argued that
Turkish investors were new to the idea and that this unfamiliarity kept it limited.
In 2001, the license of the largest “special finance house”, Ihlas Finance House8
(IFH) was revoked. Since 2001, IFH is still liquidating and deposit repayments
are pending. Thousands of depositors lost their life saving due to the absence of
deposit insurance. IFH liquidation is another reason why Islamic banks in Turkey
could not flourish. Turkish Islamic banks have offered deposit insurance since 2005,
removing the most important challenge in their growth. The figures in Table 6.3
show that since 2006, commercial banks have grown 3.85 percent per quarter for
a total of 47.59 percent, while Islamic banks have grown 6.60 percent per month
for a total of 94.99 percent. Considering the leveled playing field for commercial
and Islamic banks, the higher growth rate shows the tendency of public to consider
Islamic finance as an alternative to traditional banking.
Along with the religious tendencies of the general public, the recent Erdogan
government’s religious tendency also needs to be evaluated. While most of the
parliamentary representatives of the Justice and Development Party either came
from Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) which has been closed by the Constitutional
High Court9 due to its un-secular and radical religious acts, Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan has served a prison term due to citing a religious poem that calls
for Islamic movement. More recently, in 2008, the Justice and Development Party
was tried by the Constitutional High Court for its actions against secularism. Some
parliamentary representatives of the Justice and Development Party were accused
of pro Shari’ah speeches and actions. The Constitutional High Court ruled not
8Please refer to http://www.ifk.com.tr/ for more information about the history and liquidation process of
this special finance house.
9June 22, 2001 available at www.anayasa.gov.tr
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TABLE 6.3: Quarterly change in the deposits collected (converted to USD)
by commercial and Islamic banks operating in Turkey. Source: Central
bank of Turkey and available through http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/
Commercial Banks Islamic Banks
Total Deposits Total Deposits
Date (Billions of USD) Change (Billions of USD) Change
2006 - Q1 176.8 6.2
2006 - Q2 178.6 0.99% 6.6 5.56%
2006 - Q3 175.5 -1.71% 6.7 2.14%
2006 - Q4 189.9 8.15% 7.5 11.29%
2007 - Q1 206.2 8.62% 8.0 6.68%
2007 - Q2 225.2 9.20% 9.2 15.11%
2007 - Q3 242.7 7.78% 10.4 12.61%
2007 - Q4 267.8 10.32% 12.1 16.57%
2008 - Q1 282.6 5.54% 12.9 6.74%
2008 - Q2 285.0 0.86% 13.5 5.10%
2008 - Q3 305.3 7.12% 14.3 5.88%
2008 - Q4 261.0 -14.50% 12.2 -15.13%
to close the political party, but to impose a fine. This ruling is considered to be
evidence of the religious tendency of the current Turkish government.
6.5 International Integration and Increased
Religious Tendencies?
Within the previous sections the discussion established the ongoing relationship
between Turkey and the EU as well as the increased religious tendencies of the
Turkish public and the current government. In this second section, the emphasis is
towards establishing the different levels of integration with the western world dur-
ing different Turkish governments. The traditional integration literature measures
integration through either co-integration or correlation.
In this study, the underlying assumption is that the public builds an opinion
about the domestic market based on international and domestic events. A higher
level of integration leads to Granger (1969) type causation. The domestic market
simply follows the foreign market. If the Turkish economy or Turkish financial
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markets are dependent on US financial markets, then it will follow the US markets.
Instead, if it is dependent on the European financial markets, then it will simply
follow the European markets. The daily data provides robustness and reliability
over traditional methods that employ quarterly or monthly economic variables.
While the correlation between the markets provides an alternative measure of
integration, causality shows market dependence.
6.6 Data
Data are obtained from Reuters’ Quotecenter application for several financial mar-
kets along with Istanbul Stock Exchange (Istanbul Menkul Kiymetler Borsasi)
(IMKB). European market indices include; FTSE 100 (FTSE) from the U.K.,
DAX (GDAXI) from Germany, CAC 40(FCHI) from France, and SMI (SSMI)
from Switzerland. Since the EU and the US are competing markets, causality of
the US markets towards IMKB is also examined. American market indices include
NYSE composite (NYA), NASDAQ composite (IXIC), S&P 500 (GSPC) and Dow
Jones Industrial Average (DJI).
The daily data are available for IMKB beginning on October 30, 1987. Thus,
other markets are also limited to the period starting from October 30, 1987 and
ending in December 31, 2008. This period starts with the second Ozal government
and covers 15 Turkish governments up to the current government. Table 6.4 pro-
vides the correlations between IMKB and foreign markets. It is interesting to note
the statistically significant correlation of IMKB with German, French and Swiss
markets for 47th (Akbulut gov.), 48th (Yilmaz gov.), and 49th (Demiral gov.) gov-
ernments during November 1989 and June 1993 period. During this time, IMKB
has no correlation with the American markets. Almost no correlation exists be-
tween IMKB and foreign markets evaluated here for the period between June 1993
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and June 1997. This period’s governments are 50th − 54th. Only the 54th govern-
ment, which is the Erbakan government, can be categorized as religious right. After
June 1997, the correlation between IMKB and both European and American mar-
kets is evident, except for the short-lived Ecevit’s 56th and Gul’s 58th governments,
which lasted less than 5 month each.
It is interesting to note that correlations have generally positive but alternating
signs. Overall European markets average statistically significant correlation coef-
ficient is 0.2861 while it is 0.2192 for the American markets. During the second
Erdogan government, the statistically significant correlation coefficients’ average
is increased to 0.3894 for the American markets and 0.6695 for the European mar-
kets. Based on the correlations between IMKB and the European and the American
markets, it can be concluded that Turkish financial markets are becoming more
and more integrated with the western world.
6.7 Model and Empirical Findings
At this stage the question is the impact of different governments on international
integration, and specifically with the EU. The correlation analysis is also extended
to causality to evaluate the dependence of Turkish markets on the European and
the American markets. However, it is expected that during some Turkish govern-
ments, the US markets will have causing effect and during some other Turkish
governments, the EU markets will have causing effect. There are two hypotheses;
Hypothesis 6.1. Foreign financial markets do not Granger (1969) type cause
Turkish financial markets?
Hypothesis 6.2. Religious tendencies of the governments do not matter in the
Granger (1969) type causality from the US and the EU markets?
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In order to test the first hypothesis, Granger (1969) type causality using a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model (Sims, 1980) is estimated. For each exchange, in order
to establish stationarity, daily returns for stock exchanges’ indices are calculated.
This return is calculated for each day and for each of the stocks indices included in
the study. Since four European markets and four American markets are included
in the sample, the VAR model is estimated for each of the eight markets. Since
these eight markets are potentially correlated with each other, foreign markets are
evaluated one by one for their Granger (1969) type causality with the IMKB. Also,
since the sample period starts from December 1987 and ends at December 2008, it
includes 15 Turkish governments. Thus, the above model is re-estimated for each
of the eight foreign markets and each of the 15 Turkish governments for a total of
120 Granger (1969) type causality estimations.
In order to select the correct lag lengths for the IMKB returns and for the
foreign markets, each estimation (for each index and for each government) is esti-
mated using a high number of lag lengths following Enders (2003). Then, based on
the statistical significance of the highest lag length, lags that are not statistically
significant are eliminated. This method is repeated until the AIC (Akaike, 1974)
criterion is minimized and white noise residuals are obtained. Also, as a robustness
check to this method Ng and Perron (2001) method is used to find the highest lag
length. The Granger (1969) type causality is tested using a Wald test (Enders,
2003) which evaluates the combined significance of potentially causing variable’s
coefficients.
Table 6.5 provides the results for the estimation of the Granger (1969) type
causality using VAR model (Sims, 1980) as specified above for each of the 15
Turkish governments since 1987 and for each of the eight foreign markets. It is
interesting to note that during the Akbulut’s 47th, Yilmaz’ 55th and Erdogan’s
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59th governments, (either all or majority of) the European and American markets
Granger cause the Turkish market. This is evidence towards international inte-
gration. During the Demirel’s 49th, Ciller’s 50th and 52nd, Yilmaz’ 53rd, Erbakan’s
54th, Ecevit’s 56th and Gul’s 58th governments, there is no causality from either
the EU markets or the US markets.
During Yilmaz’ 48th, Ecevit’s 57th and Erdogan’s current (60th) governments,
while the US markets Granger cause the Turkish market, EU markets do not. In-
terestingly, while during Erdogan’s 59th government the causality was both from
the European and the American markets, during his 60th government there is no
causality from the European markets. This difference between 59th and 60th gov-
ernments, in terms of causation from the European markets, provides the answer
for the second hypothesis. Within the initial parts of this study, it was argued that
religious tendencies are on the rise since 2006 for the Turkish public. It was also ar-
gued that for the Justice and Development Party, religious tendency was officially
declared by the Constitutional High Court in 2007. Thus, it is concluded that for
the 59th government, a religious party in government is part of the democratic
process. Within the increasing international integration of the Turkish republic,
international markets welcome the level of democracy in Turkey. Thus, in this pe-
riod, Turkish markets were highly integrated with the US as well as with the EU
markets.
During the 60th government, however, the international worries over the rise of
Islam in Turkey and the Justice and Development Party’s self confident policies
slow Turkey’s EU process and start the disintegration process. Thus, along with
the slowing EU talks and pending reforms, Turkish markets lose confidence in the
EU markets and focus solely on the long-time ally, the US.
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6.8 Conclusion
Challenges exist to measure the effect of religion on politics and economics. The
traditional proxies for the level of religious tendency are not free of bias. Islamic
banking (vs. commercial banking) in Turkey provides a unique measure of public
religious tendency. Also, a government that is elected to office twice and penalized
by the Constitutional High Court on the second time is also unique. It provides
a measure for the level of government’s religious tendency as defined by law. Two
reliable measures of religion and international integration, the EU in particular,
are evaluated for Turkey. European and American financial markets’ causality to-
wards the Turkish market is evaluated. The underlying assumption is that; if the
public perceives the foreign market to be integrated then the foreign market will
be followed. The Granger (1969) type causalities are estimated for 15 Turkish
Governments, for 4 European markets and for 4 American markets.
The evidence shows that the Turkish government, especially the Justice and De-
velopment Party (JDP), became more religiously oriented. The public also became
more religious as evident by the Islamic banking deposits as well as increased votes
for the JDP on the 2007 elections. In terms of the impact of religion on the inter-
national integration, if Turkey is internationally integrated then it is influenced by
the US. However, the impact of the EU varies. For two governments of Erdogan,
59th and 60th, the integration with the EU disappeared as Erdogan’s party’s reli-
gious orientation became evident. Even though the markets are still correlated, the
causality did not exist for the 60th government. This implies that as Turkey moves
away from its secular status, its economic and political ties with the western world
are severed. Also, as JDP became more “Islamist”, it may no longer be perceived
as a welcomed part of the democratic process. As for future research, it may be
interesting to evaluate the similar venue for other major religions.
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